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Courting Toyota, Selling Kentucky: 
Conflict and Relationship Building in the Establishment of Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
of Kentucky, 1984-1989 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Thesis 
 
In an address to the Japan/American Society of Kentucky, Governor Steve 
Beshear in 2008 called the building of Toyota Motors assembly plant in Georgetown, a 
small town in rural Scott County, Kentucky, “the most positive domino effect 
imaginable.”
1
  It is now widely recognized that the arrival of Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing of Kentucky (TMMK), located in Georgetown, Kentucky, and Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, North America, located in Erlanger, Kentucky, changed the 
commonwealth in profound ways.  However, the change Toyota brought was not an 
inevitable march of welcome progress. 
The road Toyota traveled to Georgetown was undeniably a rough one.  Objections 
raised by those opposed to the plant ranged from complex legal argument to outright 
racism.  Each step in the path that brought the Toyota plant to rural Scott County 
encountered the same problems many others have faced.   The small community of 
Georgetown and the larger area of Scott County confronted a drastic shift in self-
                                                          
1
 Steve Beshear, “Japan‟s Economic Impact in Kentucky: Then, Now and Beyond,” Japan/America Society 
of Kentucky Conference, 25 March 2008, author‟s notes. 
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identification.  The transition from a rural agrarian milieu to an industrial and 
international worldview presented painful changes to those who retained the values of a 
preindustrial world.  Though Scott County had experience with several industries, the 
huge economic and social change that Toyota promised represented a concrete shift in 
both the image of the area and how the citizens of Scott County identified themselves.   
Industrial development in Scott County came not with the inevitable forward 
march of falling dominos, but rather as part of a complicated and sometimes painful 
process of relationship building forged between the national, state, and local 
governments, a multinational corporation, and two cultures engaged in a courtship that 
could have also resulted in polarization and animosity.  All parties involved played a role 
in the new wave of industrial development in central Kentucky that was represented by 
TMMK in Georgetown. 
The use of the term relationship is particularly important.  Envisioning foreign 
implants (large industries that came to locate or relocate due to economic or political 
reasons during the 1980s) as icons of progress that spurred industrial growth in small 
communities presents problems in analysis.  The interpretation of a company so large as 
to transform a community presents an image wherein the community itself is helpless in 
the face of a new master.  It is certain that Toyota, as a force of economic might, held a 
large amount of coercive control over the shaping of events and control of other entities 
and individuals.  The ability to control and shape the actions of others, for the sake of this 
paper, can best be described as power.  It is through recognizing the presence of this 
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power (whether used or unused) that an examination of such a relationship can be made 
clear. 
The Toyota plant indeed represented a change in rural central Kentucky.  The 
largest form of employment in the area would no longer be agrarian but rather industrial.  
As a large company Toyota offered many economic benefits.  However, the citizens of 
Kentucky also held significant power in this situation.  Although the installation of 
TMMK was the result of large forces (the state government and Toyota), the ultimate 
success of the venture lay in the hands of the citizens of Kentucky.  TMMK was not a 
force of an inevitable forward march of progress, nor was it simply a prize won by a 
powerful governor.  The announcement of a new car factory in Georgetown was in fact 
the beginning of a relationship among the citizens of Kentucky, the state government, and 
the multinational corporation known as Toyota.  Each of the parties in the arrangement 
held power. And while the nature of that power would shift over time it is clear that each 
party retained enough power to affect the final outcome.  Toyota offered much needed 
jobs.  The state controlled policy and offered a record-breaking incentives package.  The 
people of Kentucky voted, exercising control over the state government.  They also 
“voted with their feet,” deciding where they would work and even what kind of car they 
would buy.   
Rather than a large and powerful “domino,” causing a chain of events out of 
others‟ hands, the industrial development of Scott County, tied to the Toyota plant, is best 
represented as a relationship which begins in courtship and ends in union.  In a 
relationship each participant controls an amount of power that can determine the nature 
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of the liaison or even sever the link entirely.  In order to understand the industrial 
development of Scott County, focus should not be directed at the initial impetus of the 
transformation, but rather at the use of power in the budding relationship.  Because each 
party held power, it is how the power was used, as well as an appreciation of the shifting 
balances of that power from moment to moment, that leads to understanding of the nature 
of the change that took place.  In this manner, the courtship of Toyota was not a one-way 
wooing of a prized paramour.  The courtship was, rather, an undulation of powers that 
remains in constant motion.   
Additionally, it is through studying the actions of each party, as a form of power 
usage, that the terms industrial development and industrialization fail to define 
adequately the change occurring not just in Georgetown but also in many other rural 
communities in the Midwest during the 1980s.  Industrialization, the shift from an 
agrarian to an industrial society, indicates a static beginning and end.  It would be more 
accurate to call the change Scott County was undergoing, industrial acculturation.  In 
other words, the change was just as much a social shift as an economic shift, and 
sociological change, when compared to economic change, is more dynamic and 
unpredictable in nature.  Therefore, if the events surrounding TMMK are regarded as a 
relationship, it is easier to see a fluid situation.  Thus a study of TMMK specifically and 
foreign direct investment generally will reveal change as an ongoing state of affairs rather 
than as an event that can be regarded myopically and separately from the broader course 
of history.   
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Chapter 2 
Historiography 
Two published works offer considerable insight into the birth and growth of 
TMMK in particular.  First, Japan in the Bluegrass edited by P.P. Karan contributes a 
great amount of statistical knowledge.  The work is a collection of papers presented at a 
conference at the University of Kentucky in 1999, which was inaugurated by former 
Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa.
2
  Although most of the presentations were 
obviously written in endorsement of TMMK, the collection still offers a wealth of 
information regarding the decision on Toyota‟s part to place the plant in Kentucky, as 
well as the state‟s role in attracting the company.  Other papers analyze the economic and 
social impact of TMMK on Kentucky.  Substantial statistics are also presented which 
offer important information regarding public attitudes toward Toyota, particularly in 
Scott County. 
Second, Elizabeth Duffy Fraas provides significant insight into Kentucky‟s state 
government in The Public Papers of the Governors of Kentucky: Martha Layne Collins 
1983-1987, a collection of the most relevant documents of the governor‟s tenure.
3
  
Included in the volume is the correspondence between the governor and Toyota 
executives as well as statements made by Governor Collins regarding TMMK.  Fraas‟ 
commentaries prove noteworthy and discerning in bridging the gaps in documentation. 
                                                          
2
 P.P. Karan, ed., Japan in the Bluegrass (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001). 
3
 Elizabeth Duffy Fraas, ed., The Public Papers of the Governors of Kentucky: Martha Layne Collins 1983-
1987 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006). 
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Several other works encompass the larger trend of Japanese automotive implants.  
In Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland: Corporatism and Community, Robert 
Perrucci examines the overall phenomenon of Japanese automobile companies building 
in the mid-western United States.  The author explores many different companies; 
however his research on Toyota and Kentucky are valuable for the context in which they 
are offered.  The events in Kentucky of 1984 to 1986 did not occur in a vacuum.  
Undoubtedly, all of the players involved in Toyota‟s coming to Kentucky were keenly 
aware of other states and companies‟ experiences in forming their own respective unions.     
A concept of Perrucci termed “embeddedness” bares significant weight in this 
exploration of state funded industrial expansion.  Perrucci argues that the success of 
many of these plants stems from the ability of the players involved to “embed” the plant 
and the company into the community.  While this concept is particularly helpful in 
understanding how Toyota and the state made overtures towards the community, the 
actions of the community and the citizens of Kentucky deserve an equal amount of 
scrutiny.  All sides of the growing relationship must be understood in order to see the 
flow of power in cementing the needs of each player. 
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Chapter 3 
Background and Methodology 
The relationship between Kentucky and Japan began in the early part of the 1980s 
as an unequal one, having more to do with international economics than a multinational 
corporation and state government.  During the 1980s, the United States went from being 
the world‟s largest creditor nation to the world‟s largest debtor nation.  In 1978 the 
United States trade balance showed its first deficit in eighty-five years.  In four years, 
from 1980 to 1984, the trade deficit grew from $10 million to $135 million.  U.S. 
industries such as steel, auto, and consumer electronics began to suffer from competition 
abroad.
4
  Japan, as the second most powerful industrial nation in the free world, 
represented one of the biggest competitors to the U.S. manufacturing sector.
 5
 
In what came to be called the “economic miracle,” or the “Jimmu Boom” 
(referring to the mythical Jimmu who founded Japan in 660 B.C.), the Japanese economy 
witnessed unprecedented growth after the Second World War.
6
  As the U.S. economy 
was slowing during the late 1970s and 1980s, the booming economy in Japan flooded the 
world market with consumer and industrial goods.
7
  Japanese direct foreign investment 
inside the United States during the Reagan Era grew to such levels that American fears of 
Japanese economic control began to be seen in popular fiction works such as Michael 
                                                          
4
 Robert Perrucci, Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland: Corporatism and Community (New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter, 1994), 2. 
5
 Robert E. Cole and Taizo Yakushiji, The American and Japanese Auto Industries in Transition  (Tokyo: 
Technova Inc., 1984), xxi. 
6
 Edwin O Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1977), 115. 
7
 Ibid., 116. 
8 
 
Crichton‟s Rising Sun.
8
  The mounting fears of Japan were reflected in many national 
polls and studies.  As will be shown later, growing pessimism pervaded American 
attitudes as the U.S. fell deeper into the recession surrounding the mounting trade deficit, 
rising unemployment, and stronger foreign competition.   
In Kentucky, as well as the rest of the country, the call for employment was a 
common issue for the commonwealth‟s first female governor.  Despite increasing anti-
Japanese sentiment in much of the country and its leadership, the economic prospects that 
Japanese auto transplants represented to state governments and out-of-work citizens was 
undeniable.  After Toyota‟s decision to build in Georgetown, it rapidly became clear that 
there would be a relationship between the corporation and the citizens of central 
Kentucky.  However, it was not at all clear what the nature of that relationship would be.  
Toyota automobiles were a common sight on American roadways, and other Japanese 
automakers had built successful plants in other parts of the Midwest, such as Tennessee 
and Indiana.  Toyota had also built a thriving partner plant with General Motors in 
California.  The shape and effects of a potential plant were well understood to most who 
would be affected.  Therefore the deciding factor in the formation of the relationship was 
the actions and reactions of Kentuckians.  While the state government and Toyota used 
power explicitly in negotiating, buying land, and later trying to sell the deal to the 
citizens of the commonwealth, the people used power implicitly through voting and 
buying habits as well as explicitly through protests and citizens organizations that applied 
pressure to ensure the relationship developed in a way that fit the community.   
 
                                                          
8
 Michael Crichton, Rising Sun  (New York: Ballantine, 1992). 
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In order to understand how the relationship between Kentuckians and Toyota (and 
in many ways Japan itself) developed, three important factors must be analyzed: the 
overall national picture, the actions of state and local government, and the reaction of the 
local citizens impacted by the introduction of such a large industry.  While these large 
themes provide a framework, a detailed examination involves many other elements.  
Inside this framework other interactions that apply in an interconnected fashion can be 
better recognized. 
First and foremost, it is important to understand the national events and 
perspectives that both formed the ideals of the intersecting parties and allowed the 
subsequent events to occur.  An examination of the political-economic policies of both 
the United States and Japan reveals the volatile economic climate of the decade.  This 
climate particularly applies to the automobile industry, which to the public at large 
symbolized the growing disparity between American and Japanese technology.  Also, a 
look at popular culture in the form of books and films as well as editorials in national 
magazines and newspapers will underscore the national tone in the U.S. regarding  the 
perceived onslaught of Japanese companies.  Contemporary surveys also offer a glimpse 
into American perceptions of Japan and Japanese companies.  As these will show, the 
growing fear many felt of Japan and the Japanese became a key driver of governmental 
actions; indeed, public attitudes were a major force in policy decisions regarding 
economic relations.  American public opinion was both reflected in popular literature and 
influenced by the messages delivered by those works.  Any picture of the country the 
Japanese implants found in the 1980s would be incomplete without considering the role 
of popular culture and national mood because these were often the cause of governmental 
10 
 
policy and economic relations.  In this manner popular culture, national mood, and 
governmental policy and foreign relations fall into a category that must be regarded as a 
whole. 
A second and equally important factor in the establishment of TMMK are the 
actions and policies of Kentucky‟s state government as well as the actions of the local 
government of Georgetown and Scott County.  Governor Collins actively lobbied for 
Toyota to build a plant in Kentucky, but she encountered several potential roadblocks 
along the way from both state legislators and local Scott Countians.  Tensions within the 
state of Kentucky ignited a delicate dance as the legislature, the governor‟s office, local 
officials, Toyota management, and the United Auto Workers each promoted ends that 
appeared irreconcilable.  Although compromise seemed immensely desirable to all 
parties, success was by no means inevitable.   
The actions of state policymakers weighed heavily in the ultimate relationship 
formed between the state and TMMK.  The public archives of Governor Collins as well 
as excellent coverage from the region‟s newspaper of record, The Lexington Herald-
Leader, map the labyrinth of public policy adjustments and political maneuvering 
necessary to accommodate TMMK. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the reactions of average Kentuckians to 
the introduction of Toyota played a vital role in the relationship formed in Scott County.  
If TMMK had been poorly received by the public, its place in the commonwealth would 
have been tenuous.  Any significant negative reaction would have also threatened the 
profits and stability of Toyota.  Poor community perception would have also caused 
11 
 
considerable instability in the workforce.  Scott County‟s transition from an economy 
dominated by agriculture to an industrial economic culture was often difficult, and 
resistance was by no means trivial.  The citizens of Scott County did not live in a 
vacuum; other parts of the state within a short distance had long since developed into 
industrial areas.  While residents in the Georgetown/Scott County community were most 
affected, the rest of the state was just as involved in forming the relationship.  Public 
opinion statewide had significant impact on the actions of politicians and businessmen 
alike.   
While public perception is often difficult to quantify, several methods offer a 
glimpse of how TMMK was originally perceived by Kentuckians as they sought to 
balance a need for jobs with changes that were swift and often intimidating.  Many 
Kentuckians felt strongly enough to express their feelings in letters to local newspapers 
as well as to the governor‟s office.  While extreme feelings on either side of any issue can 
often present a polarized interpretation, if properly analyzed and researched they also 
offer a window into understanding the perception of Kentucky as a collective 
consciousness.  Surveys conducted at the time are also easier to understand when 
measured against the stratum of extreme opinions. 
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Chapter 4 
The Nation 
In his New York Times best-selling novel Rising Sun, author Michael Crichton 
tells the story of a murder that occurs at the grand opening of the Nakamoto Tower, a 
high-rise building in Los Angeles meant to be the new headquarters of a massive 
Japanese corporation.  As the protagonist investigates, he uncovers layer upon layer of 
intrigue and corruption.  The Nakamoto Corporation has influence reaching from the 
local police to the federal government at a time when America is losing its grip on its 
power inside its own borders.  While the work was fictional, much of the paranoia 
portrayed was real.  As a senatorial candidate in the novel said shortly before being 
coerced to change his platform, “Many Americans fear that we may become an economic 
colony of Japan . . . . Many Americans feel that the Japanese are taking over our 
industries, our recreation lands and even our cities.”
9
  In assessing the overall national 
landscape, works of popular culture such as Rising Sun offer revealing insight into a time 
period.   
The 1980s was a time of fear as America‟s economy faced recession while 
simultaneously, the Japanese economy enjoyed unprecedented growth.  In order to 
counter the threat posed by Japanese imports, the U.S. implemented protectionist policies 
to allow American companies to compete.  In the case of import quotas, the threat was 
enough to lead the Japanese government to compel their car companies to limit exports to 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., 252. 
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the U.S.
10
  The new tariffs and quotas had other effects as well.  Many Japanese 
companies saw the advantage of moving manufacturing directly to the U.S. in order to 
circumvent tariffs. These expansions, which began on a large scale with the Japanese 
automakers in the middle of the decade, brought this Japanese threat directly to the 
people of the U.S. as they saw these large auto companies encroaching on local 
communities and small towns such as Nissan in Smyrna, Tennessee and Honda in 
Marysville, Ohio.  Surveys taken in the early part of the decade showed that between 
1980 and 1982 the number of Americans who held a favorable view of Japan fell from 84 
to 63 percent.
11
 
Fears stemming from the Second World War resurfaced in the early parts of the 
decade as many Americans saw Japan‟s growing economic presence in the country as a 
threat to national security.  In polls conducted at the time, many cited memories of the 
war and fears of Japan “taking over” the United States.
12
  Although most people did not 
accept such dire predictions, explosive rhetoric in the media and political spheres fanned 
the flames of anti-Japanese sentiments.  
As Japanese foreign direct investment in the U.S. increased dramatically, 
protectionist debates in the White House and Congress became heated.  From 1970 to 
1987, foreign direct investment in the United States went from $13 billion to $262 
billion.  During the 1980 presidential campaign, vice-presidential candidate George H.W. 
Bush indicated that a Reagan administration would look at restricting Japanese imports as 
                                                          
10
 Lexington Herald-Leader, 4 June 1984. 
11
 New York Times, 6 April 1982. 
12
 Ibid. 
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a way to protect U.S. auto companies.  President Jimmy Carter also expressed concern 
and favored the United Auto Workers‟ attempts to encourage Japanese companies to 
build in the United States, though he did not want to restrict Americans to buying U.S.-
made “gas guzzlers.”
13
   
First published in 1979, Ezra F. Vogel‟s Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America 
became highly influential.  Vogel attempted to explain Japan‟s rapid growth and success 
in terms of models and institutions that western countries could emulate in order to make 
similar achievements, calling for a total reevaluation of American institutions.  Vogel 
wrote that “in the effectiveness of its present-day institutions in coping with the current 
problems of the postindustrial era Japan is indisputably number one.”
14
  With its 
provocative title and message Japan as Number 1 became influential not just in the 
business community, where emulating Japan was quickly falling into vogue but the work 
also served to strengthen American fears of growing Japanese economic power.  Japan as 
Number 1 went through eight printings by 1983.
15
 
Racist sentiments also played a part in the debate.  In Detroit in 1982, a Chinese 
man was beaten to death by an American automobile worker and his stepson because 
they mistook him for a Japanese.  Each was sentenced to three years‟ probation.
16
  In 
1981, workers in a Teledyne plant in Milwaukee tore down and set fire to a Japanese flag.  
In the industrial Midwest, imported Japanese automobiles were blamed for the loss of as 
many as 250,000 jobs.  Many Japanese executives living in manufacturing, agricultural, 
                                                          
13
 Perrucci, Japanese Auto Transplant, 2-4. 
14
 Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 22. 
15
 Sheila K. Johnson, The Japanese Through American Eyes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 
136. 
16
 Ibid., 122. 
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and technological areas of the United States claimed some degree of racism and 
discrimination.
17
   
The media in Japan were also concerned with what was perceived as a tense racial 
atmosphere.  The Japanese media gave particular attention to an incident in the 
Democratic Environmental Caucus in which Congressman John D. Dingell of Michigan 
called the Japanese “little yellow people.” Speaking to a Japanese reporter, Akio Morita, 
the founder and chairman of the Sony Corporation, expressed dismay about the intensity 
of anti-Japanese sentiments in the U.S.  “Things appear to have gotten as bad as they 
were on the eve of World War II . . . . I myself am repulsed by it.”
18
 
Morita, along with Shintaro Ishihara, a member of Japan‟s leading political party, 
coauthored the original Japanese version of the sensationalist book, The Japan That Can 
Say No: Why Japan Will be First Among Equals.  When the book was published in the 
United States, in 1989, Morita chose not to allow the release of his sections of the book 
for fear of negative publicity for the Sony Corporation.
19
  Morita had previously 
published an autobiography titled Made in Japan that was highly critical of American 
business practices.  Made in Japan, however, adopted a far less confrontational tone, only 
pointing out differences and occasionally chiding some particularly distasteful American 
                                                          
17
 New York Times, 6 April 1982. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1989), front flap. 
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traits such as corporate headhunting.
20
  His work with Ishihara, however, suggested a 
coming confrontation in which only one winner could emerge. 
By the end of the 1980s, many of the fears held by Americans seemed to be 
justified by the release of a translated copy of The Japan That Can Say No.  Ishihara 
detailed ways in which the Japanese government and Japanese companies could surpass 
the U.S. as the greatest power in Asia and the global economy.  The arguments Ishihara 
outlined were so startling that the U.S. State Department began circulating bootleg (and 
poorly translated) copies around the congressional halls.  This unauthorized translation 
served to fan the flames of protectionism and political rhetoric.  Ultimately, Ishihara‟s 
appeal for open dialog and understanding between Japan and the United States became 
less important than the alarming issue of economic threat that his works highlighted. 
The first part of the title The Japan That Can Say No elucidates one of the greater 
misunderstandings between Americans and Japanese.  In Japanese culture the direct use 
of the word no, or any confrontational language, should be avoided.  Often vagueness is 
substituted in order to allow the other party to save face.  It is considered rude to cause 
embarrassment to another person.  This was famously illustrated when Japanese Prime 
Minister Eisaku Sato told President Richard Nixon that he would “do my damnedest” to 
remedy the situation caused by Japanese textile imports flooding the U.S. market.  Nixon, 
believing he had a deal, later assumed he had been lied to when nothing was done.  In 
reality Sato had meant nothing of the kind.
21
  By proclaiming that it was time for Japan to 
                                                          
20
 Akio Morita with Edwin M. Reingold and Mitsuko Shimomura, Made in Japan (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1986), 151-52.  
21
 Robert C. Christopher, The Japanese Mind (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1983), 172-73. 
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say “no,” Ishihara was indicating more than just a refusal to acquiesce to U.S. demands.  
He was also urging an uncommonly aggressive stance for his country in relations with the 
United States. 
The second part of the title, Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals, underscored 
the inherent tensions involved in U.S./Japanese relations.  Beginning in the 1960s (in the 
shadow of Japan‟s postwar occupation), the United States had emphasized the concept of 
an “equal partnership” between the two allies.  This “Reischauer Line” (a phrase coined 
by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer) was often used in diplomatic circles 
to describe the desired relationship that the U.S. envisioned for Japan.
22
  While 
earnestness on the part of most American policymakers and diplomats served to ease 
tensions, the obvious inequality of the situation in postwar Japan gave the phrase an aura 
of condescension.  Ishihara‟s (and Morita‟s) use of the phrase “first among equals” was a 
direct challenge to American foreign policy and a blunt confrontation to U.S. economic 
hegemony on the world stage.  The fact that many observers took the book seriously gave 
credence to the growing fears of Japanese economic power many held in the 1980s.  
Whether or not Ishihara‟s arguments were sound, his work had a significant impact on 
American attitudes toward Japan.  The Japan That Can Say No spent seven weeks on the 
New York Times bestseller list in 1991.
23
   
In purely economic terms, the threat of Japan‟s growing economy proved 
somewhat exaggerated.  By the early 1990s Japan saw a recession that greatly reduced its 
economic clout.  Unrestrained lending and speculation led to a growing bubble that burst, 
                                                          
22
 Edwin O. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 196-97. 
23
 Johnson,  The Japanese Through American Eyes, 15. 
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sending the Nikkei Index into a downfall despite numerous efforts by the Japanese 
government to stabilize the economy.
24
  Poor structural issues as well as internal strife 
between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance caused the Japanese government 
to falter in dealing with the rising value of the yen.
25
  As the yen went up in value it 
caused export prices to rise.  In countries where Japanese exports had retained the 
advantage of cheaper prices, domestic products became competitive.  As Japanese 
companies also found it cheaper to move production overseas to places such as the 
United States, unemployment in Japan rose.  This hollowing out caused the bubble 
formed by Japan‟s rapid growth to become unstable.  Economic collapse soon followed.  
Ironically, instead of easing American fears, this loss of economic power on the part of 
the Japanese was often used as a plot device by some authors as the trigger for violence.  
In his novel Debt of Honor, which will be discussed later, Tom Clancy used an economic 
threat to provide the impetus that allowed Japanese businessmen to force their country 
into a second war with the United States.
26
 
Although the economic playing field eventually began to level off in the 1990s, 
few in 1980s America foresaw any weakness in the growing Japanese presence in the 
U.S.  In much of the United States the outlook of the general public became broadly 
pessimistic. This overall negative attitude grew steadily throughout the decade.  By 1989, 
48 percent of Americans believed the U.S. was declining as a world power.
27
  And in 
1991, 52 percent of Americans (and 53 percent of Japanese) thought Japan would be the 
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number one economic power of the next century.  Only about 30 percent assumed it 
would be the United States.
28
 
In addition to economic tensions and lingering hostilities, racial prejudice in the 
popular media and culture reflected some fundamental misunderstandings between the 
two cultures that contributed to the anxious national mood.  Several works such as Sheila 
K. Johnson‟s excellent The Japanese Through American Eyes have examined American 
stereotypes of Japan through the lens of popular fiction, films, polls, and editorial 
cartoons.  However, for the sake of this study, the period from 1975 to 1995 bears 
significant weight in regard to the atmosphere faced by Japanese direct investment 
ventures in the United States.  As Detroit continued to falter during the 1980s and into the 
1990s, the automobile industry prominently symbolized the depths of Japanese economic 
incursion.  As a result, Japanese-owned automobile plants bore the full weight of 
American attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese people. Toyota, the largest Japanese 
automaker, was the most visible of these companies. 
American popular literature about Japan during the years surrounding the influx 
of Japanese-owned auto plants tended to fall into four major (yet not completely distinct) 
categories, all of which affected attitudes toward Japanese companies.  The first category, 
economic studies promising profit from copying the Japanese, was expansive and 
enjoyed a significant following.  Second, fiction dealing with the Second World War, was 
commonly utilized before as well as after the decade.  A third category emphasized the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture to attract attention to the differences from western culture 
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one could find in Japanese society.  Finally, and perhaps solely linked to the time period 
surrounding the implant era, works focusing specifically on the economic tensions 
between the two countries exploited this anxiety to weave tales of violence linked 
directly to Japanese business.  This category, more than any other, directly urged a 
negative American view of Japan and Japanese business. 
As the second-leading economy in the world, it is little wonder that many books 
would be written about how Japan and its businesses had grown.  In addition to models 
and institutions such as those enunciated in Japan as Number 1, Americans were eager to 
learn how the “Japanese system” and its specific techniques and strategies could work for 
them.  Many books were published which offered increased profits and productivity 
using “lean production,” just-in-time delivery, or kanban (sign-board) assembly 
production. Musashi Miyamoto‟s martial strategy guide, The Book of Five Rings, was 
even studied in American business schools, “where it was thought to contain important 
Japanese business precepts.”
29
   
One of the most popular of the works attempting to explain the reasons for 
Japan‟s success, William Ouchi‟s Theory Z, delineated the Japanese business philosophy 
towards workers.  American companies, Ouchi claimed, could see more achievement by 
fostering lifetime attachments with their workers.  Japanese companies were flourishing 
in terms of productivity because they offered lifetime employment and other incentives to 
their workers.
30
  While it is debatable whether most of these practices were actually 
widely used in Japanese business, many American businesses and individuals sought 
success through the Japanese methods.  (Most of Japan‟s most successful businesses 
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actually used practices suggested by Dr. W. Edwards Deming, an American.)
31
  Theory Z 
spent twenty-two weeks on the New York Times bestseller list in 1981.
32
   
By 1990, shortly before it collapsed, the Japanese economy, and Toyota in 
particular, had become so strong that many were lauding Japanese production and 
management methods as the new standard, even going so far as to call Toyota‟s “lean 
production” system, The Machine That Changed the World.
33
  Japan‟s economy was 
flourishing, its companies dominated, and everyone was trying to explain how it had 
happened and how to profit from that knowledge.  Unfortunately, so many different 
theories were advanced that what resulted was more confusion.  In this confusion 
additional works of fiction only served to foster more conflicting perceptions of the 
Japanese. 
Regardless of genre, the Second World War was one of the most common and 
expected settings for works about the Japanese.  War, as a perennial theme in the arts, is a 
common topic of creative minds.  In most such movies and books the Pacific Theater was 
a static setting.  On one side the Japanese were the evil antagonists and on the other the 
Americans were the embodiment of righteous heroism.   
Yet the Pacific Theater held a distinctive place in the American mind.  As Ruth 
Benedict claims in the opening of her classic work on Japanese culture, The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, “The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United 
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States had ever fought in an all-out struggle.”
34
    A steady stream of popular histories, 
war memoirs, and World War Two fiction added to this perception of the Japanese.  The 
Japanese of the war were a people of both evil acts and unknowable minds, capable of 
both human logic and cunning as well as animal ferocity.  The legacy of the Second 
World War weighed heavily in the minds of those who had fought and those who felt the 
burden of America‟s faltering economy. 
However, in addition to the histories and novels about America‟s triumph over 
aggression and evil, many works also looked inward at American mistakes and barbarism 
during the war.  In his Pulitzer Prize-winning oral history The Good War (which spent 
over five months on the New York Times bestseller list),
35
 Studs Terkel recounts the 
stories of individual soldiers and others who lived through the war.  In one account, 
similar in tone to many others, E.B. (Sledgehammer) Sledge tells of his anger towards the 
Japanese for what was done in China, the Philippines, and Bataan.  In the same interview 
Sledge also remembers atrocities committed by American soldiers.
36
  In the same work 
Terkel also tells the story of several hibakusha, survivors of the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  In addition to lingering animosities about the war, 
Americans were well aware of the horrors inflicted in the dropping of the bombs.  Several 
works such as John Hersey‟s Hiroshima were extremely influential in the United States.  
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Americans flocked to hear survivors‟ accounts of the bombings and donated money for 
memorials, outreach, and survivor healthcare.
37
   
While hard to quantify, guilt as an influence in American attitudes toward the 
Japanese was not limited to the hibakusha.  During the Second World War thousands of 
Japanese-Americans were detained in internment camps in the U.S. in order to ensure 
that they would not spy for the enemy.  It was during the late 1970s and l980s that many 
of those who were imprisoned in these camps began to bring the incidents to national 
attention.   In 1988, Congress passed a bill which gave each survivor of the camps 
$20,000 and offered an official apology.  President Reagan, when signing the bill, called 
the camps “a grave wrong,” and pointed out that Japanese-Americans had remained loyal 
during the war.
38
  How much of an impact feelings of guilt played on American attitudes 
toward the Japanese is a subject beyond the scope of this study.  However, it is important 
to recognize that Americans were discovering ambiguities in previously clearly defined 
lines of right and wrong concerning the war. 
The concept of the Japanese as alien and unique contributed to a third category of 
works.  In many treatments of Japan and its people the Japanese were the intriguing 
“other,” a culture that was at once fascinating and impenetrable.  This idea pervaded 
many books and movies regarding Japan, and some popular books and movies featured 
this motif, focusing heavily on ideas of honor and the martial history of the country.  
Inevitably, these works trended toward the violent aspects of Japanese culture.  The 
Japanese, these works contended, simply held drastically different views about man‟s 
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relationship to society.  It was these works that focused on defining for western audiences 
how the Japanese thought. 
Two particularly popular works made heavy use of this idea.  The novel Shogun 
by James Clavell told the story of an English ship captain who found himself wrecked in 
seventeenth-century Japan.
39
  In the epic story the protagonist, Blackthorne, views 
medieval Japan through the eyes of a westerner.  [Given Blackthorne‟s reaction to 
Japanese sexual practices and violent acts it seems likely that the character is viewing 
them more through the prism of twentieth-century sensibilities than those of a 
seventeenth-century mariner.]
40
  He and his crew are subjected to tortures and cruelties as 
their captors decide their fate.  They have entered a world of violence and subjugation 
where the military establishment rules all facets of daily life.  Arrogant samurai behead 
those of lower status on a whim, and suicide is not only frequently practiced but is 
something to be desired as a final path towards honor.
41
 
Blackthorne is exposed to a litany of abuses and humiliations.  However, instead 
of hate he grows to respect the Japanese.  Clavell leads his audience, through his 
protagonist, down a path toward appreciation and acceptance of his interpretation of 
historical Japanese culture.  Yet it must also be understood that the primary appeal of 
Shogun was a fascination with a culture unique and alien to American sensibilities.  This 
factor and the allure of violence cannot be overlooked in the popularity of the novel and 
the later twelve-hour miniseries on NBC.  It is obvious from the work‟s popularity that in 
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regards to Japan, Americans expected both a violent and an alien culture.  Shogun 
simultaneously reinforced this belief and urged its audience to attempt to understand the 
deeper facets of Japan and its people.  It is unclear, though, whether it succeeded in this 
latter attempt.
 42
   
Another popular hit during the decade that emphasized and utilized a theme of 
exceptionalism was the “Karate Kid” series.  In the first movie a teenager who is being 
bullied, Daniel LaRusso, learns the Japanese martial art of karate from a neighborhood 
handyman.  His mentor, Mr. Miyagi, teaches Daniel, through the course of three movies, 
about both self-defense and nonviolence.  Four films were made in the popular series.  
(The fourth stared Hilary Swank as a female “karate kid” alongside Pat Morita reprising 
his role as Mr. Miyagi.)  It is important that these films featured a positive image of 
Japanese and Japanese-Americans.  As Sheila Johnson points out, “In The Karate Kid our 
guide to the Japanese ethos is a Japanese-American.”
43
  Miyagi is not the typical stoic 
samurai of past works: he mourns his wife, drinks, and weeps for the burdens of his past 
which separate him from those he loves.  Yet Miyagi is still in many ways a stereotype of 
the Japanese.  He is obsessed with miniature bonsai trees and unswerving in matters of 
honor and duty.  The movies also focus on many exotic features of Japanese culture.  
Throughout the films, moviegoers are deluged with images of obon festivals, tea 
ceremonies, and kimono.  Daniel faces a culture that demands, in the name of honor, 
sacrifices that are painfully illogical and contradictory, all the more so because of the 
alien nature of the culture.  The films brought to American audiences a picture of a 
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culture that was both different and human and as such strengthened positive images of 
Japan while simultaneously reinforcing the alien nature of Japanese culture.
44
   
A fourth category of thought surrounding consideration about the Japanese seems 
to combine elements of the first three.  In the aftermath of World War Two, many in the 
United States laid blame for the conflict on wealthy Japanese business leaders.  These 
huge business conglomerates, known as zaibatsu, were responsible for Japan‟s war-
making capability and, many believed, were also behind the incitement of the war.  
During the American military occupation after the war, many on both the left and right 
sides of the political spectrum urged the dissolution of these powers.  However, most of 
the zaibatsu, seen as vital to the country‟s recovery, were allowed to survive.
45
 
By the Reagan era zaibatsu were no longer a subject debated in only the academic 
realm.  Instead they had become the villain in a large number of popular works.  In The 
Rising Sun these business leaders vied for control of the United States through subtle 
power plays and underground violence.  However, in many works, zaibatsu were even 
more nefarious.  Eric Lustbader‟s series of novels featured ninja - spies and assassins in 
medieval Japan - who are used freely and frequently by Japanese zaibatsu to assassinate 
business rivals in the United States.
46
  Three of these novels, The Ninja, The Miko, and 
White Ninja, spent a combined thirty-five weeks on the New York Times bestseller list 
from 1980 to 1990.
47
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By the end of the decade zaibatsu had become the ultimate evil.  In Clive 
Cussler‟s Dragon as well as Tom Clancy‟s Debt of Honor, Japanese business leaders 
actively sought the destruction of the United States.  In Dragon a group of wealthy right-
wing zaibatsu business leaders smuggle nuclear weapons into western countries in order 
to blackmail world leaders into acquiescing to their demands.  They then insist (among 
other things) that Hawaii and California become Japanese territory.  To draw readers‟ 
minds even further into a World War II mindset, the hero sets off an atomic bomb in the 
sea off the coast of Japan.  The bomb had been intended as a third attack following the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The bomber carrying it had been shot down and 
sunk, where it was left by the U.S. in order to ensure that no one knew it had ever existed.  
The underground explosion from the half-century-old weapon causes a tsunami that 
wipes out the enemy stronghold before the terrorist businessmen can activate their 
bombs.
48
   
In Clancy‟s Debt of Honor the zaibatsu are not just devious terrorists.  The 
business leaders in Japan are those who control that country‟s government.  These men, 
led by one who holds bitter memories from the war, guide Japan towards a direct military 
confrontation with the United States.  First, they attempt to destroy the American 
economy through cyber espionage.  Then the Japanese move to seize the Northern 
Mariana Islands, an American commonwealth.  In the novel, Japanese citizens are 
whipped into an anti-American frenzy and violently target foreigners in the country.  All 
of the difficulties are caused when the United States government passes a bill designed to 
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mirror Japanese trade practices.
49
  The suggestion is that war could easily flow from the 
very real trade friction between the two countries and that Japan would use violence to 
maintain an unequal trade balance.  Both Dragon and Debt of Honor spent months on the 
New York Times bestseller list.
50
   
Whether popular fiction, movies, and other forms of entertainment were merely 
reflections of societal thought or, in fact, a driving force in the national psyche, matters 
little.  It is through examining these most popular works that American perceptions of the 
Japanese can be seen.  The fact that many people were exposed to, and sought out, these 
works clearly displays two sociological imperatives:  Although many Americans were 
interested in the Japanese, a great number of Americans did not trust or were fearful of a 
powerful Japan. 
While popular entertainment can be illuminating in many cases, it is of particular 
import when studying American attitudes toward Japanese and Japanese-Americans.  Up 
until 1965, laws severely limited Japanese immigration to the United States.  After 
regulations were loosened Japan was well on its way to economic power.  As a result few 
Japanese actually chose to immigrate when they could.  By 1980, Japanese-Americans 
were only the third-largest Asian-American ethnic group.  Also, a majority of Japanese 
immigrants were female, married to an American husband.  Also most Japanese 
immigrants were clustered on the East and West coast.
51
  As a result, relatively few 
Americans (particularly in the Midwest where most implants were built) had first-hand 
encounters with an ethnic Japanese.  The case was even rarer for an average American to 
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have contact with a first-generation Japanese or Japanese-American.  This scarcity of 
exposure would for an average American magnify the significance of popular media and 
entertainment.  For many in Middle America, books and films formed opinion long 
before Japanese-owned auto companies began building. 
As Japanese auto companies were investing in implanted factories in the United 
States the national mood toward the Japanese appeared vaguely negative.  The American 
government was struggling with a recession and trying to craft economic policies that 
could deal with a growing Japanese economy.  At the same time polls showed that 
Americans were increasingly ambivalent about both America‟s future and Japan‟s 
intentions.  While Americans faced Japan‟s growing economic clout, popular media 
portrayed a Japan that was both unfathomably alien in culture and consistently aggressive 
both violently and economically.   
Kentuckians, then, had reasons to be suspicious of Toyota.  Undoubtedly, most 
had been exposed to the national media, whether through national stories covered in the 
Lexington Herald-Leader or network and cable television, or simply popular fiction and 
word of mouth, the flow of information was constantly available for those who would be 
the decision makers in Central Kentucky.  For older Kentuckians, memories of the 
Second World War contributed to the impressions of the Japanese.  Letters to the 
governor‟s office following the announcement of the plant often mentioned fears that 
were prevalent in the American popular culture that has been discussed.  The Second 
World War was also often mentioned.
52
  However, Kentuckians also had a strong reason 
to welcome Japan‟s largest automaker.  Toyota, like the Japanese automakers that came 
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to other states, offered thousands of well-paid jobs that Kentuckians desperately needed 
in the face of America‟s deepening recession.  Martha Layne Collins and others in 
Kentucky government made sure that jobs were the focus of any public communications 
about Toyota. 
 
  
31 
 
Chapter 5 
The State 
 
On November 14, 1985, Governor Martha Layne Collins held a lavish state dinner 
at the Executive Mansion in Frankfort for Toyota executives who were concluding their 
inspection of possible sites for a car plant to be built in the United States.  The 
unexpected late-night fireworks caused some in the area to call the police, concerned that 
the state capital was being attacked.
53
  The following morning Collins‟ advisor and head 
of Kentucky‟s Japan branch, Jiro Hashimoto, went to the hotel where the Toyota visitors 
were staying so he could buy all the copies of the morning papers.  Even if the visitors 
had enjoyed the fireworks, they would not have enjoyed the publicity, as confidentiality 
was of great importance to the company.  While working to lure the Toyota plant to 
Kentucky, Collins often disagreed with advisors who recommended low-key events.
54
  
The governor‟s instincts proved to be correct.  However, her solicitousness towards 
Toyota was only one of her tactics for drawing in the company.  As Hashimoto‟s actions 
demonstrate, Collins had to maintain a fine line in many matters in order to establish the 
appearance of a united and friendly front for Toyota executives as well as potential 
investors.  Most of the governor‟s efforts in her attempt to win Toyota went towards 
presenting the state as a place that would be welcoming of the automaker. 
In order to appreciate Toyota‟s decision-making process and its evaluation of 
Kentucky‟s political climate, it is important to understand and evaluate the actions of the 
governor.  Many, both with Toyota and in Kentucky, gave the majority of the credit for 
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the company‟s choice and the fairly smooth transition to Governor Collins.  In an 
interview in 2010, Governor Collins pointed to her childhood as a Southern Baptist and 
her attending meetings of the Women‟s Missionary Union.  “I grew up studying 
missionaries all over the world and when you study missionaries you study the 
geography, the topography, the education, the politics, the food -- all of it.  And so it‟s 
easy for me to work with them.”  “Basically what you have to have is what your mother 
taught you,” she continued, “your Sunday manners, to be polite, to be respectful.”
55
    
Toyota was the last and largest of the major Japanese automobile companies to 
build a plant in the United States.  Because of its joint venture with General Motors to 
manufacture cars in California, many believed that the company would remain absent.
56
  
And by 1985, the Japanese government had lifted the voluntary quotas on auto imports 
that it had compelled Japanese automakers to accept.
57
  Other factors, however, made a 
Toyota import plant not just profitable but necessary.  While Toyota had hung back, other 
Japanese automakers had been busy establishing plants and bases of loyalty.  Toyota had 
watched as its competitors‟ overseas operations earned increased profits.  Making the 
situation even more profitable, the United States had allowed the value of the dollar to 
fall against the Japanese yen and other currencies.  This was an attempt to make U.S. 
exports less expensive in competitor markets.  With the dollar low compared to the yen it 
had become much more cost efficient for the Japanese to build in the United States than 
in Japan.  So even without the threat of trade restrictions, the low dollars had the 
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unintended consequence of drawing foreign direct investment from competitors eager to 
build on American soil and buy American companies and real estate.
58
   
Toyota was not the first target of the governor‟s attempts to draw investment.  
After Commerce Secretary Carroll Knicely had recommended to the newly elected 
governor that the Commonwealth make overtures to a variety of companies.  Collins 
formed a team of advisors to work toward economic development.  This team was 
composed of Knicely, Cabinet Secretary Larry Hayes, and Ted Sauer, the executive 
director of the Kentucky Commerce Cabinet's Office of International Marketing.  The 
governor‟s team attempted to lure auto-makers from both the United States and Europe 
before looking toward Japan.
59
 
By the time Kentucky established an office in Japan in April 1983, twenty-one 
other states already had offices in that country.  By 1985, however, Kentucky‟s 
commerce secretary was able to announce a new Japanese investment in the state, “on the 
average of once every 60 days.”
60
  In the early part of the decade the Japanese, according 
to Knicely, knew little of Kentucky: “They knew about Kentucky Fried Chicken and „My 
Old Kentucky Home‟ and that was about it . . . . The image they had of Kentucky was 
primarily of a backwoods state.”
61
  This sentiment was echoed by the head of Kentucky‟s 
Japan office, Jiro Hashimoto: “My most difficult task was to give Kentucky a new image 
as an industrial state for Japanese investors, rather than as the home of Kentucky Fried 
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Chicken and bourbon whiskey.”
62
  Kentucky‟s goal of attracting Japanese business thus 
hinged on first conquering prejudices on both sides.   
Many factors, such as unemployment numbers, geography, and education, played 
roles in the decision making of Toyota and others.  However, only a few of these could 
be immediately manipulated or accentuated by the governor‟s office and its negotiators.  
Three tactics the governor‟s office employed were the most successful in strengthening 
ties to Japan and Japanese business.   
First, the governor made use of Kentucky‟s existing contacts with the Japanese.  
Kentucky Fried Chicken Japan sponsored many of the governor‟s activities in the region, 
even paying $1.5 million to sponsor one of her trips to Japan in 1985.  In popular culture 
The Stephen Foster singers, who performed “My Old Kentucky Home,” were very well 
known in Japan, where they toured in 1985.
 63
  The governor seized on this cultural tie by 
having the group perform for many of her functions with executives.
64
  Commerce 
Secretary Larry Hayes, who was Kentucky‟s cabinet secretary at the time, regarded the 
name recognition alone as being very important to the state‟s initial attempts to meet with 
executives.
65
   
Collins and Hashimoto chose to make use of preconceptions of Kentucky rather 
than instantly trying to debunk them.  Put simply, the majority of people in Japan had 
little thought of the state.  Those who had occasion to think of that part of the United 
States probably brought some stereotyped images with them.  However, it was much 
more important for Kentucky to become known to those in the Japanese business 
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community than for the state to sponsor a myth-busting tour.  After speaking with 
automotive makers both in the United States and Europe, Governor Collins began calling 
on companies in Japan as part of her visits to the country.  She started with lower-ranking 
officials and worked upward with each meeting.  “Some people might have gotten very 
aggravated or impatient or whatever but I didn‟t.” she has recalled. “We built a 
relationship, I had lots of friends, still do, in Toyota.”
66
 
The news media was a second factor in Governor Collins‟ foreign relations.  They 
played an important role in attracting Japanese investments.  The Lexington-Herald 
Leader, in particular, one of Kentucky‟s leading newspapers, was outspoken in its 
support for the Toyota plant.  After the announcement of the plant, the paper ran more 
than two dozen editorials mostly in favor of the project and the state‟s investment.
67
  In 
addition to its role of informing Kentuckians about the factory, the news media played an 
important part in attracting investments.  It is clear from interviews in national 
newspapers that Japanese business leaders often closely examined American media.
68
  
Larger companies would have meticulously scrutinized any site for investment months 
ahead of time.
69
   
While investigating central Kentucky through the media, Japanese executives 
would have seen several articles published in the Herald-Leader in which several 
Kentucky cabinet members praised Japanese business investments in the state despite 
strong anti-Japanese rhetoric from the national congressional leadership and Reagan 
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administration.  In an interview published in the paper, Commerce Secretary Knicely 
lauded Japanese investment in Kentucky as “a boost” to the economy.  In referring to the 
trade friction between the U.S. and Japan, Knicely said it “doesn‟t disconcert me at all . . 
. . I feel like we are helping the trade imbalance when we attract investment here.”
70
   
The previous year the paper had published an article about the benefits that 
Nissan had given to the small town of Smyrna, Tennessee.  The town was once known 
primarily for the speed-traps it used to bolster its failing revenue.  Now, with the new 
auto plant, the town was growing and thriving.
71
  Kentuckians could see the results of 
Japanese investment in many surrounding states.  In addition to Nissan in Tennessee and 
Toyota‟s joint venture in California, other Japanese automakers had built plants in Ohio, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois.
72
  In December the paper also ran an article praising 
plants in both Tennessee and Ohio.
73
   The more the media covered these implants the 
greater the benefit was to both Toyota and Martha Layne Collins.  As other plants were 
accepted in the Midwest, Toyota could make use of the expectations such success 
instilled in prospective communities anxious for the potential employer.  Kentuckians 
saw jobs being created in other states as well as at home by plants supplying parts to 
plants in other states.  Through this positive coverage, Collins could present Kentucky as 
a place united in its desire for a Toyota plant and eager to accept outsiders. 
Viewing Kentucky as a place that would enthusiastically welcome a Toyota plant 
was ultimately one of the critical factors in the company‟s decision.  When asked why his 
company chose Kentucky a Toyota official said: 
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The most decisive factor was the dinner party hosted by Governor Collins 
in November.  Governor Collins arranged to have many people there – 
The president of the University of Kentucky, the president of the 
Kentucky Chamber of Commerce and all these people.  Our people 
thought that here in Kentucky everybody is united to help Toyota.
74
  
 
Giving Toyota a picture of a united Kentucky was not accomplished merely 
through dinner parties.  Governor Collins and her aides displayed particular 
solicitousness towards Japanese businesses.  After the dinner party Collins released a 
statement about the event saying that Toyota had “repeatedly asked that their site 
evaluation process be conducted in a highly confidential manner . . . . I cannot emphasize 
to you too strongly the need for maintaining this level of confidentiality."
75
  The 
governor‟s office honored this request diligently.  Before the dinner the governor knew 
that the site selection was down to Kentucky or Tennessee;
76
 however, no mention of this 
leaked to the press.  
Throughout the selection process, Governor Collins and Kentucky‟s Commerce 
Cabinet remained remarkably attentive to Toyota as well as other foreign investors.  In 
September 1985, Commerce Secretary Knicely told the Herald-Leader, “In this 
administration we‟ve made four trips to Japan . . . . They know if they have a problem 
that needs to be solved, we can be on the scene – with the governor, if necessary.”
77
  
While being interviewed in 2001, Collins recalled her approach to the negotiations:  
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Toyota was my customer.  I was providing a service.  Toyota had 
narrowed it down from around twenty states, to sixteen, down to ten.  At 
one point they asked for more information.  I told [executive director of 
the Kentucky Commerce Cabinet's Office of International Marketing] Ted 
Sauer, “Take this information and go [to Japan and] personally deliver it, 
and stay there, and answer any questions they might have.”  That project 
team didn‟t have any other states that did that.  So it was one of those 
things where they said, “They‟re going to work with us.”
78
 
 
Governor Collins later stated that as far as she was aware Kentucky was the only 
state that had high-ranking cabinet members personally deliver information to Toyota.  
She credited this in part for her success.
79
  Collins also recalled sending her team to New 
York City to “accidentally” run into Toyota chairman Eiji Toyoda and arrange a 
telephone conversation with Collins.
80
  It was on this New York trip that the decision was 
made to establish a plant in Kentucky.
81
 
In addition to the governor‟s office, local Georgetown officials and state 
legislators also met with Toyota and often expressed a desire to work towards 
accommodating the company.  Collins later said that because so many legislators had 
visited Japan and Asia and had talked with Toyota and other companies, it made the 
passage of an incentives package in the legislature much easier.
82
   Kentucky‟s U.S. 
Senator Mitch McConnell said through a spokesman that he had been in contact with 
Toyota several times a week and was available to “meet, talk, answer questions, 
persuade, cajole, whatever.”
83
  Georgetown‟s mayor and the Scott County Judge 
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Executive also answered questions from the company‟s selection committee and 
expressed a strong desire for the plant. 
A final (and ultimately controversial) tactic used to reinforce Kentucky‟s desire to 
help Toyota was the record-setting incentives package the state offered to the company.  
Many economists have speculated that the size of the incentives packages matter little to 
large companies given that the largest incentives represented only a small fraction of the 
initial investment a company had to make to establish a plant.
84
  However, Kentucky‟s 
incentives package, estimated to be between $125 and $350 million, was at the time the 
largest state incentive ever offered to a multinational corporation.
85
  [While much of the 
incentive went for land options and tax incentives, $55 million went directly to worker 
training and much also went to providing the initial hiring infrastructure for the plant.]
86
  
In an interview with the Louisville Courier-Journal, a Toyota executive spoke about the 
importance of Kentucky‟s huge incentives package when asked if other states had offered 
more: 
I cannot say because once we actually decided to come here then we 
started to go into details.  The other states we did not get into that.  Those 
incentives [from Kentucky] were just enough to cancel out the 
disadvantages, such as inadequate sewage capacity, hilly land and narrow 
roads near the site.  If the government had not offered that we would not 
have been able to come here.  But we came here not because of that (the 
incentives package) but because we felt we had the full support of the 
people here.
87
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As the quote indicates, the incentives package was important to Toyota.  (It would 
have been absurd for a company official to curtail future possible incentives by indicating 
that they did not matter.)  However, when the decision for a plant location was made, the 
actual size of the package had not been negotiated.  Jiro Hashimoto agreed, saying, 
“Incentives were not everything but Toyota wouldn‟t have located in Kentucky without 
the incentive package because of the competition from other states.”
88
  Indeed, further 
research conducted during the 1990s indicated that incentives bore little significance 
financially when a company was choosing a location.  Incentives became more important 
after the decision was made.
89
  The most important part of the incentive was that it 
signified that the state was fully supportive of Toyota.   
As Robert Perrucci suggests, incentive packages can also have another relevance 
for multinational corporations.  By observing the political maneuverings in forming an 
incentives package and the later public debate after the package is made public, a 
corporation can gauge the level of support that exists within the state for the company.  A 
governor who promises something and then has trouble within his or her own legislature 
would then lose credibility in negotiations.  Also, if a legislature is strongly divided, then 
the site loses value even if the dollar amount of the package is large.  In addition, the size 
of an incentives package before it is made public indicates the strength of the negotiators 
because it reveals the level of confidence in the strength of the package that the governor 
and legislators anticipate.  A larger offering gives assurance that once the incentives 
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package is made public that it will stand.  Thus, “the politics of the incentives package 
may be more important than its economics.”
90
 
One important value of the incentives package was that a large portion of it went 
to acquiring the land on which the plant would be built.  This allowed Toyota executives 
four important advantages in addition to lessening expenditures on the initial cost of the 
plant.  As previously mentioned, Toyota was afforded the opportunity to observe 
reactions of citizens in Georgetown to a possible plant.  While negotiations were handled 
in secret, the presence of Japanese nationals and sudden presence of a third party (in this 
case Norfolk Southern)
91
 making inquiries about land options was an obvious indication 
to citizens about the strong possibility of Toyota‟s building a plant in Scott County.  
While most of the small community was enthusiastic about the reported three thousand 
jobs the plant represented, some landowners balked at initial attempts to acquire their 
property.
92
 
This difficulty with some of the holdouts in the attempted acquisitions allowed 
Toyota to observe the standing of Kentucky‟s government in terms of following through 
on its promises.  Favorable terms in any agreement would have little benefit if the state 
could not honor its end of the bargain.  Meanwhile Toyota‟s third advantage, that of 
plausible deniability, allowed the company to avoid some of the bad feeling that any 
strong pressures on landowners might generate in the media. 
Finally, in its role as a third-party observer, Toyota‟s process for finding a site 
was greatly simplified.  The company could devote resources that might have been used 
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to negotiate for land for other pursuits.  It could also measure the public reaction 
generated by the speculation about the site and the actions of the state and those acting 
for the state.  In this manner the value of the state‟s incentives package figured greatly in 
Toyota‟s decision.  While the monetary value of the package held significance, it was 
also of great value to the company in gaining insight into the mindset of the other parties 
in the situation that had yet to directly voice their opinions concerning the potential 
agreement.  The state could make any contract with the company it chose but the ultimate 
say in the success of Toyota‟s venture would belong to the citizens of Kentucky. 
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Chapter 6 
The People 
 
The official announcement of Scott County as the location of Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, was made on December 11, 1985.
93
  In the final days before 
the announcement all indications pointed to Kentucky.  Indeed, the night before official 
word was given, Senator McConnell called a press conference to make his own 
announcement.
94
  However, it was not until the governor, state and local officials, 
influential Kentucky citizens, and Toyota executives gathered in rural Scott County to 
openly dedicate the site that average Kentuckians began to openly play a part in the 
decision-making process. 
In assessing the reaction of Kentuckians to Toyota it is important to study not just 
quantified reactions on the part of citizens, such as through surveys.  It is also useful to 
observe how leading actors tried to influence public reaction.  By analyzing local 
government, state government, the media, Toyota, and other interested parties it is easier 
to understand both how the public was expected to react and why it reacted the way it 
did.  Of particular interest are the local government‟s interaction with Toyota and the 
gubernatorial election of 1987.  Politicians, as the most vulnerable to public opinion, 
often provide clues, through their actions, of how the public was expected to react.  The 
successful gubernatorial campaign of Wallace Wilkinson, who first spoke out against the 
incentives deal and then later retracted some of his harshest rhetoric, is particularly 
revealing. 
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As Toyota used Kentucky‟s incentives package to gain insight into how 
Kentuckians would view the plant, so too did the record-breaking payout serve as a 
jumping-off point for citizens to make their initial observations about the deal Governor 
Collins had concluded on their behalf.  The people‟s reaction to this offer to Toyota as 
well as other perceived negatives and positives would ultimately lead the commonwealth 
to form a relationship with the large multinational corporation.  The nature of this 
relationship, not secret negotiations and back-room deals, would be the difference in 
whether the venture succeeded or failed.  Also, additional supplier plants and businesses 
might have appeared to have fallen into place in a “domino effect” as Governor Beshear 
asserted in 2008.
95
  However, the character of Toyota‟s relationship with the people of 
Kentucky was what influenced where each plant would be located.  In other words, it was 
no guarantee that Toyota‟s suppliers would locate in Kentucky.  
Similar to her strategy to sell Kentucky to Toyota was the governor‟s effort to 
shape the company‟s image to Kentuckians.  But Collins was not the only party trying to 
influence public opinion regarding the automobile giant.  The media in Kentucky before 
and after the announcement devoted a great deal of attention to Toyota.  Between 1984 
and 1986, the Lexington Herald-Leader ran hundreds of articles concerning the company.  
Particularly in the days leading up to a decision from the company, the paper published 
several articles about the benefits of similar imports to other states.  The majority of these 
articles mentioned the large number of jobs and the economic boost offered by the 
factory.  However, the paper also pointed out the potential negatives of the plant, 
including additional traffic congestion, possible pollution, and increased population.   
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As the media, with its own role to play, worked to make Kentuckians aware of all 
views, each of the other actors in the arrangement made their positions known.  The two 
most visible parties, the state government and Toyota, each immediately began to paint 
the agreement in a positive manner, extolling the added jobs, the boost to the economy 
and education, and the positive image that the plant could give to the state.   
However, after the plant was announced, others began to voice opposition to the 
company.  These critics cited widely diverse reasons, yet they all seemed to revolve 
around the central theme of resistance to a perceived imposition on citizens by forces that 
they could not control.  In order to understand the complex web of competing interests it 
is vital first to understand the participants involved in the debate and their own desires.  It 
is how the people of Kentucky perceived these groups that set the foundations of the 
state‟s relationship with Toyota.   Of the participants in the debate the most prevalent 
were Toyota, state government, local government, organized labor, and one very vocal 
group called Concerned Citizens and Businessmen of Central Kentucky (CCBCK).  The 
following will focus on how each group presented itself and its interest to citizens of 
Kentucky as well how the Commonwealth responded to these groups.  Additionally, 
because it is of particular value in assessing public reaction, the role of the media and 
how it was used by and how it responded to each party will be examined.   
Additionally, while using the media to analyze different groups and the power 
they wielded, it must be understood that the media was also a powerful group.  In the 
growing relationship between Toyota and various powers within the commonwealth, the 
media also had the power to control the nature of the liaison.  Each editorial, news story 
and even advertisements, added to the general knowledge the public used to make its 
46 
 
decision.  The media, however, decided what was newsworthy and what could be 
overlooked.  And as will be seen later, even the decision about what was in proper taste, 
had lasting impacts on how Toyota was able to settle into Kentucky and the community 
of Georgetown. 
 
Toyota and the People: 
 
Toyota, the largest of Japan‟s automakers was also the most conservative of the 
transplant companies.
96
  Change for the automaker was difficult, just as it was for the 
citizens who would feel its impact.  It was the role of the company to recognize the 
problems that could occur and lessen the inevitable tensions.   
While the Toyota plant would have the most direct impact on Scott County and 
the Lexington Metropolitan area, the whole of Kentucky had a role to play in determining 
the success of the venture.  With such a large undertaking Toyota would need “willing 
workers, nearby suppliers and a convenient base for U.S. operations in rural Scott 
County.”
97
  None of these could be supplied completely by the small community of 
Georgetown.  Using a system of “just-in-time” delivery, Toyota‟s production methods 
differed radically from typical mass production in the United States.  Instead, Toyota 
employed a production technique known as “lean production,” which utilized small 
groups and broad employee classifications.  Instead of opposing force relationships 
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between labor and management, a consensual relationship was emphasized.
98
  And most 
important to Toyota‟s success, long-term relationships with suppliers were necessary.
99
     
The automobile, a complex piece of machinery, required a ready supply of parts 
made to very exacting standards.  In order to ensure a steady output of products, each 
part, ranging from seats and steering wheels to full body frames and tires, must be 
available in a steady stream to the assembly plant.  Unlike American auto companies, 
lean production as practiced by many Japanese companies called for very little on site 
inventory.  Instead, parts were provided daily to the assembly plant from a large network 
of supplier plants located within a close driving distance of the central factory.  This 
system called for close ties between Toyota and its suppliers, many of which would be 
located in Kentucky.  In order for Toyota to succeed, these suppliers needed to succeed.   
The difficulties surrounding differences in business practices between U.S. and 
Japan most often surrounded the Keiretsu system.  Keiretsu, often compared to zaibatsu, 
refers to the interconnected and interdependent system of multi-company conglomeration 
of industry.
100
  Toyota‟s keiretsu structure, a focus of many studies, has been called “one 
of the most complicated keiretsu systems of the Japanese enterprises.”
101
  Unlike 
zaibatsu, the keiretsu system often skirted antitrust laws in both Japan and the United 
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States by an interconnectedness not just of family or ownership, but also through loose 
associations.  For instance, an executive from one company might sit on several boards of 
a competitor.  In addition, many executives maintained friendships with leaders of supply 
companies or companies that could influence their own.  To many critics, the keiretsu 
system was perceived as even more threatening than the zaibatsu.  The chain of 
connection was much more convoluted and hard to break through.
102
  This centralization 
of control and interconnectedness of Japanese business often caused concern among 
Kentuckians.  However, Governor Collins suggested in a recent interview that because 
Toyota owned a majority share of most of its suppliers, it was more likely those suppliers 
would locate in the state despite the rancorous atmosphere surrounding the incentives 
package.
103
 
Although most central Kentuckians welcomed the plant, the question was not 
whether Toyota would be seen as a good thing for Georgetown.  The question was what 
the environment would be later for the suppliers and those associated with the plant.  In 
order for the whole system to succeed, the voters of Kentucky needed to anticipate a 
future in which benefits could be felt around the state.  The state government, as a 
representative of Kentuckians, would not always play ally to the corporate interests of 
Toyota if the citizens of the commonwealth saw no, or little, benefit from the 
relationship. 
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The nation as well as Kentucky viewed the Japanese through the prism of mass 
media and entertainment.  Toyota, in Kentucky, became the focus of feelings about the 
Japanese in the state.  This anti-Japan sentiment was often used by forces opposed to the 
plant or Toyota‟s business model.  [Several protests against Toyota were held outside the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C.
104
]   The interest the nation found in Japan 
became interest in Toyota.  So, too, did the distrust and fear of a growing Japanese 
economic power.  As Kentucky‟s new symbol of the world‟s second-largest economic 
power, it was incumbent upon Toyota to work swiftly to shape its image in a positive 
light.  It was also incumbent upon state officials to follow through on delivering a 
citizenry that was fully behind the deal.  Governor Collins had promised a Kentucky that 
would be united in support of Toyota. Although much of the state may have seen the 
potential good from Toyota, the situation was still tentative as the people of Kentucky 
were suddenly confronted with the reality of a Japan that was much closer than a book or 
film. 
The benefits of the Toyota plant to the areas around Georgetown were relatively 
obvious.  However, the rationale for the rest of the state was less evident.  In matters 
pertaining to image, Toyota was fortunate to have the state government working on its 
behalf.  In many instances the interests of the state and the company coincided.  While 
the state had to justify its large incentives to the automaker, Toyota immediately had to 
start playing the role of a good corporate citizen. 
Not coincidentally, the nature of Toyota‟s agreement with the state allowed it to 
remain in the background on many controversial issues.  In some cases, inaction on the 
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part of the company worked in its favor as much as some more overt measures.  Two of 
the biggest expenditures of the incentives package were for the purchase of land and for 
the training and hiring of workers for the plant.  These were also two of the most volatile 
areas of Toyota‟s interactions with the citizens of the state.  Perhaps one of the best 
decisions on the part of Toyota was to let the state handle matters that under other 
circumstances the company might have wanted more control over.  In other words, by 
relinquishing one type of power, Toyota was able to redirect the power to the public, 
instead of placing itself directly in playing field.   
In some instances conflict surrounded the purchase of farmland from families 
who had inhabited the area for decades.  In the case of one particular family, conflict 
grew when Marilyn Singer, a farmer‟s wife, refused to sign documents for a land option 
on the property.  Although the property was for the Toyota plant, the story in the media 
centered around the commerce cabinet and pleas to the woman from both state and local 
government officials.
105
  Toyota was regarded more as a silent witness to the exchange as 
heated rhetoric floated around the state.  Eventually the deal was agreed to without the 
consent of the woman, with arrangements made between state arbitrators and her 
husband.
106
  In this case, much of the negative attention involved the state government.  
Viewpoints concerning the negotiation were focused on the family and the governor‟s 
office instead of the company. 
Second, over 60 percent of the state‟s incentives package for Toyota was 
dedicated to the training and hiring of potential workers.  In the year following the 
announcement of the plant, the governor‟s office alone received dozens of letters from 
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citizens in the area looking for employment.  By the beginning of 1987, more than 40,000 
people had begun the application procedure.
107
  Most of these prospective employees 
would have to be turned away.  With the burden of these disappointments directed 
towards the state‟s employment office (Toyota still had the final say in hiring but 
referrals came from the Kentucky Employment Office), the carmaker was allowed 
enough distance to claim a modicum of innocence in the matter.   
It was reported that whatever bad feeling existed about Toyota was in fact 
directed at the state and not at the company.  The governor‟s secrecy during the deal was 
often mentioned in news stories and commentaries about the plant.  One Scott County 
resident echoed the sentiments of many in the rural community: “I have really bitter 
feelings about the governor . . . . I feel she pulled a fast one.”
108
  Many Kentuckians often 
separated feelings about the governor or the legislature from their feelings about the 
company.  Relieved of some of the burdens of bad press, Toyota was allowed to focus on 
community relations and publicity.   
On May, 1986, during the groundbreaking ceremony for the plant, Toyota made 
one of its first moves toward reconciling its goals with attitudes in the community.  The 
company announced it would donate one million dollars for the county to use for public 
facilities.
109
  While the county initially indicated it would use the money for upgrades to 
water and sewer facilities, it eventually decided to use it for a new community center.
110
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A little more than a year later, Toyota announced a corporate gift of $50,000 to the 
United Way of the Bluegrass in addition to $42,000 donated by its employees.
111
 
Gift giving, however, was not the only way Toyota tried to persuade the 
community it was a “good corporate citizen in Kentucky.”
112
  The company also 
remained responsive to local concerns about matters ranging from urbanization to the 
environment.  The company often met with local officials and interest groups.
113
  The 
term “good corporate citizen” was used frequently by Toyota.  The phrase became the 
mantra that the company employed to surround its attempts to earn the approval of the 
community and the state.  On April 17, 1987, Toyota made one great stride towards 
winning the graces of the local community.  The city of Georgetown had been worried 
about how to pay for the mounting expenses that were associated with the plant.  To help 
alleviate this burden, Toyota sent a letter to Tom Prather, its mayor, asking that the 
company be made an “official corporate citizen and taxpayer of Georgetown.”
114
  This 
allowed the city to collect around $1.7 million a year in tax revenue from Toyota and its 
employees by annexing the plant site.  This surprise move on the part of the company 
garnered significant praise from local officials.   
While it is obvious that Toyota was making overtures towards the community for 
the sake of establishing itself as a solid corporate citizen, these gifts, as well as the jobs 
the company offered, served to accomplish the goal of cementing Toyota as a vital part of 
the state.  The automaker, however, could not affect these changes on its own.  The local 
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and state governments also played a vital part in welcoming Kentucky‟s newest corporate 
partner. 
 
The State Government and the People: 
 
While making a transition to U.S. production was difficult for Toyota, helping 
Toyota to become firmly established in the state was much more trying for the governor 
as well as local officials.  Elected officials had two fronts of conflict to face in the 
aftermath of the announcement of the new plant.  While the added jobs gave a boost to 
the governor‟s Democratic Party, the incentives package as well as perceived negative 
impacts associated with the development gave ample ammunition to political opponents.  
Officials had to strive to appeal to voters as well as formulate policy that would 
accommodate Toyota and honor the agreements made in negotiations for the plant.  Many 
times these two goals were in direct opposition to each other.  
In the years after the announcement, the governor‟s office received some seventy 
requests concerning employment at the plant or Toyota.  The office referred all such 
letters to the Cabinet for Human Resources.  It is remarkable that such a large number of 
people found the need to go directly to the governor‟s office with job inquiries long 
before the plant actually opened.  Yet this fact also displays the tenuous position 
occupied by the state government.  Over half of the state‟s incentives obligation was 
devoted to handling human-resource needs for Toyota.  The Department for Employment 
Services within the Cabinet for Human Resources had “overall responsibility for 
recruitment, testing, training and job selection and referral efforts for Toyota Corporation 
54 
 
and the companies involved in preparation of the site and facility.”  This placed the 
additional burden on the department of “monitoring, evaluation, assessment, detailed 
accounting and follow-up during all phases of our involvement.”
115
 
Those applying for employment with Toyota represented a large number of 
citizens.  In addition to the 40,000 who applied for employment, the family, friends, and 
associates of those job seekers comprised a potentially powerful force in terms of votes 
and public opinion.  By taking the burden of the hiring process from Toyota, the governor 
had effectively made the job search of thousands of Kentuckians a political issue as well 
as a personal one.  Thus it was vitally important to elected officials at the state level for 
the Toyota venture to succeed. 
Of course, it is notable that the large portion of the incentives package devoted to 
worker training as well as other parts that involved education gave the governor‟s office 
an important public-relations advantage.  During her term, Governor Collins often cited 
the need for improved education.  The incentives package also called for a robotics 
institute at the University of Kentucky, a school for Japanese children, and other 
expenditures for training and education.
116
  So while the incentives package was indeed a 
liability for the governor, it was also a large educational expenditure, and the governor‟s 
office rarely missed an opportunity to point out this fact.  Collins often needed the media 
to dispel many of the false impressions that were evident in some of the letters her office 
received.  “You need the media, you need people, to try to help you explain and educate 
rather than just throwing something out wanting the reaction,” Collins commented 
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recently. “I‟m an old schoolteacher, and when there‟s misinformation on a page I‟m 
going to mark it with a red pen.  I don‟t like misinformation.  We like accuracy.  
Okay?”
117
  
As the state worked to highlight the positive aspects of the incentives package, it 
also painted a picture of immediate benefits from Toyota.  Many proponents of the plant 
declared that Toyota would bring a much-needed image boost to the state.  In the year 
following the announcement and groundbreaking for the plant, state and local officials 
mentioned the change in the state‟s image that Toyota brought in as least sixteen different 
stories published in the Lexington Herald-Leader.
118
  The proclaimed image boost that 
the large plant brought to the state served as a mollifying influence.  The jobs from 
Toyota would go mostly to those in the central part of the state; however, tax dollars for 
the incentives package came from all Kentuckians.  Often the strongest reactions against 
the plant and the incentives package in particular came from outside central Kentucky.   
Most elected state officials believed that the Toyota plant must be a success.  
However, some of these same officials also realized that quick political gains could be 
made by voicing open opposition to the large incentives package.  The incentives 
package quickly won approval in the Kentucky legislature.  But, shortly after the initial 
announcement of the package, an open rift became visible between those who opposed 
the package and those who saw its necessity.  The Toyota plant itself was rarely 
mentioned in this debate.  Most politicians refused to argue against the thousands of jobs 
it represented.  The incentives package was almost regarded as a separate matter.  This 
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development was an obvious benefit to Toyota.  The governor and state legislators, 
conversely, found difficult political ground in the large expenditure of state funds.  This 
public compartmentalization of issues also shows that the citizens of Kentucky held both 
a definite desire for the plant to succeed and a resentment (varying in severity) of the way 
the state had conducted the negotiations.  It was important to Toyota that this resentment 
and suspicion not be attached to its venture.   
It was clear that many Americans feared the economic power of the Japanese.  It 
seems that much of the fear and suspicion of Kentuckians shifted in the immediate 
aftermath of the announced deal.  Without making its negotiations public, the governor 
had made an agreement with a large company that was also a representative of the 
world‟s second-greatest economic power.  As a symbol and de facto representative of 
Japan, Toyota also became a focus of the interest that many Kentuckians felt for the 
company.  It can be argued that while the interest many felt for Japan became focused on 
Toyota, the fear and suspicion of Japan became an anger that was instead directed at the 
state government.  This is suggested by the rhetoric of war and race rhetoric that many 
people used in letters to Governor Collins.
119
  That is not to say that Toyota did not have 
to deal with some fear mongering from organized opposition.  However, it is clear that 
opposition to the incentives package was mostly antagonistic toward the governor.  This 
is most apparent during the gubernatorial campaigns.  While political opponents 
criticized the governor, in the Lexington Herald-Leader’s coverage, most avoided direct 
negative comments about Toyota.  
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Within the governor‟s Democratic Party severe criticism of the incentives 
package led the way in the upcoming gubernatorial campaign.  (At the time Kentucky 
governors were limited to one term.) Lexington businessman Wallace Wilkinson claimed 
that the incentives package was exorbitant and a sign of weakness for the state: "I think it 
went wrong from Day One because we approached the negotiations with an attitude that 
we had to have them (Toyota) whatever the cost."
120
  Later in his campaign Wilkinson 
stepped up his criticism, commenting to reporters that the deal "was stupid. We gave 
away too much. That money could have been used in creating just as many, maybe more, 
jobs throughout the state.”
121
 Of the gubernatorial candidates, Wilkinson was the most 
outspoken critic of the Toyota deal, even running several television advertisements that 
were sharply critical of the incentives package.
122
 
Other candidates, including Lieutenant Governor Steve Beshear, also criticized 
the deal.  (Later, as governor in 2008, Beshear would tout his role in the deal.)
123
  As the 
Lexington Herald-Leader pointed out at the time, the deal was an easy target because it 
had already been “offered, accepted and approved.”
124
  It is interesting that the 
Republican frontrunners were hesitant to criticize.  Both Larry Forgy and State 
Representative John Harper, the eventual Republican nominee, had played supporting 
roles in the deal.  Forgy had personally encouraged holdout Marylyn Singer to agree to 
sell land to Toyota.  This is also possibly because one of the state‟s leading Republicans, 
U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, was a strong advocate for the agreement and even 
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claimed some of the credit for the plant before the official announcement.
125
  Governor 
Collins recently commented that Senator McConnell had no role in luring the plant.
126
  
The senator‟s office acknowledged in 2010 that Senator McConnell played no part in the 
deal.
127
 
John Harper introduced a resolution in the Kentucky House of Representatives in 
February 1986 “requesting Toyota to use American engineers, architects, contractors, and 
labor in designing and constructing the Georgetown Toyota automobile plant.”
128
  This 
stand on the part of the Republican delegation in the House was relatively toothless when 
compared to Democratic rhetoric.  When announcing the resolution Harper told the 
Lexington Herald-Leader, “We're for the plant, and, by and large, the delegation supports 
the administration's $125 million incentive package to get the plant.”
129
 
After he had won the Democratic nomination, Wilkinson eased his criticism of 
the deal.  The Democratic nominee told reporters, "My campaign message was not an 
attack on Toyota.  I have nothing against Toyota . . . . This commonwealth has entered an 
agreement with Toyota and I would expect it to be carried out."
130
  However, Wilkinson‟s 
campaign rhetoric had been worrisome to Toyota, whose officials met with the outgoing 
Collins administration in order to ensure that all parts of the deal were finalized and the 
state could not break its agreements.  Collins later admitted that Wilkinson‟s opposition 
was a difficulty.  “It made my job harder, very hard . . . . It wasn‟t just Toyota, think 
about, we got a hundred and forty-some supply companies.  So if you cut off your nose to 
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spite your face by being ugly to the one thing, then what are you going to get?”
131
    After 
securing his primary victory, Wilkinson quickly moved to assure Toyota and any future 
investors that the state was still interested in providing a friendly business environment.  
In November 1987, Wilkinson would win the governor‟s race.   
Whether intended or not, it is conceivable that Wilkinson‟s opposition to the 
incentives deal also helped to offset possible anger on the part of the thousands of 
Kentuckians who would be turned down for employment with Toyota.  While the state 
was handling much of the hiring, Wilkinson, as governor, could point to his record of 
resisting the deal and blame the previous administration when disgruntled applicants 
complained of hiring problems.  What is definite is that Wilkinson found it politically 
expedient to separate himself from the agreement.  By doing so he also gained some 
strength in terms of policy towards the automaker during his term in office.  Wilkinson‟s 
opposition may have also led to further gains for Kentucky.  Toyota, perhaps preferring 
to deal with Collins, negotiated an engine plant to be built in Scott County before she left 
office.  The engine plant added another 500 to 1,000 jobs to the gains in employment for 
the county.
132
   
The fact that Wilkinson made the Toyota project a major campaign issue is 
important in understanding how the people of Kentucky regarded the situation.  The 
results of the campaign are even more important in understanding how Kentuckians had 
accepted Toyota.  This is particularly true for central Kentucky and Scott County.  In the 
Democratic primary, Wilkinson received 25.4 percent of the vote in Scott County, 
placing him second in the county.  As will be shown later, the citizens of Scott County 
                                                          
131
 Martha Layne Collins, Interview by author, 22 June 2010. 
132
 Lexington Herald-Leader, 21 October 1987 and 9 October 1987. 
60 
 
foresaw significant economic benefits to the plant; however, they were skeptical about 
many of the possible effects of industrial development.  The inconclusive position of the 
people of Georgetown and Scott County can clearly be seen in the rest of the state as 
well.  Many throughout the state both supported Toyota and opposed the incentives plan.  
Although it is impossible to ascertain true motivations, it is possible that this separation 
between cost and benefits allowed most who had reason to fear the situation to direct 
anger at state government instead of Toyota.  It would be inappropriate to conclude that 
this was the case for even a significant amount of those who raised oppositions.  
However, it must be understood that this is a possibility and the actions of many in the 
public eye provide strong anecdotal evidence to this interpretation.   
The governor‟s office also had difficulties outside of the state.  Many of the 
challenges to the deal caused the federal government to delay granting the Toyota plant 
foreign-trade-zone status.  A foreign-trade-zone or sub-zone allowed companies to delay 
paying tariffs on imported parts until the finished product was shipped.
133
  Whether 
opposition to sub-zone status was the cause or an excuse for delays is unclear.  However, 
it is apparent that the difficulties in attaining FTZ status were further indication of the 
growing friction in American attitudes toward foreign trade.  The opposition in Kentucky 
is an additional manifestation of many of these frustrations. 
In an attempt to settle the many questions regarding Toyota, the governor‟s office 
decided on what it called a “friendly lawsuit.”
134
 Most of the opposition to the incentives 
package centered around the question of whether it was constitutionally acceptable.  
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According to Kentucky‟s constitution, the state government could only give land for 
public use and specifically forbade transferring land to private corporations.  The Collins 
administration and others argued that allowing the company to use the land in order to 
create jobs constituted public use.  However, the question would remain unsettled until 
the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the incentives package.  On 
May 7, 1986 the state filed a lawsuit in Franklin Circuit Court to force a ruling.  More 
than a year later, on June 11, 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in a narrow four-to-three 
decision that the incentives package was constitutional.  While the legal battle over the 
incentives package had ended, the public debate continued.
135
 And in the intervening year 
between the filing of the lawsuit and the final decision, the debate would become 
exceedingly acrimonious. 
 
The Opposition and the People:  AFL-CIO 
 
In the year it took for the Kentucky Supreme Court to reach a verdict, two 
opposition groups vociferously opposed any action reconciling the state with Toyota.  
The United Auto Workers and other union interests made specific use of the incentives 
package to raise public sentiment in favor of their goals.  Ultimately, the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of  Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) wanted the 
Toyota plant to open as a union shop.  Toyota‟s joint venture with General Motors, New 
United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated, was a union plant, so the United Auto 
Workers had reason to believe that the Georgetown plant could be as well.  The initial 
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skirmishes, however, were fought with the Ohbayashi Corporation, which was overseeing 
the construction for Toyota.
136
  The Georgetown assembly plant would ultimately not be 
unionized.  But the battle between organized labor and the Ohbayashi Corporation played 
a more significant role in the early formation of a relationship between the citizens of 
Kentucky and Toyota.   
Initial tensions formed when Ohbayashi began preparing for construction.  To 
handle the labor contract, the company hired the law firm of Ogletree, Deakin, Smoak & 
Stewart, a firm known as a “union-buster.”
137
  Larry Hayes called the choice a mistake 
and blamed inexperience on the company‟s part.  However, the move “created an 
environment that appeared to be an anti-union environment, when truth of fact Toyota 
was viewing the construction of this plant as a one-time cost.”
138
  Others have claimed 
that Toyota never intended to use union labor and Ohbayashi‟s choice of law firm was 
evidence that the company was antagonistic toward labor from the start.
139
  Whether the 
choice was deliberate or not, it had the definite consequence of increasing the public 
perception that Toyota did not intend to open a union shop. 
Within the AFL-CIO, the Building and Construction Trades Department handled 
initial negotiations with Ohbayashi.  In June 1986, the AFL-CIO announced it would ask 
its affiliated trade unions not to refer any of their members to work on the Georgetown 
project.
140
  Ohbayashi insisted on a merit shop arrangement.  The unions balked because 
a merit shop would allow a non-union company to bid on work for the project.  
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Ohbayashi also required contractors to “agree to a no-strike clause and to work without 
regard for different shifts and who installs equipment.”
141
  In other words, once a contract 
was signed, union workers would be stripped of vital leverage in any further negotiations. 
The AFL-CIO undoubtedly wanted to force Ohbayashi (and Toyota) to employ 
only union workers.  The cause, though, was much larger than one construction project.  
The AFL-CIO chose the Toyota project deliberately.  Toyota was emblematic of the 
influx of foreign automakers, most of which were non-union.  Jerry Hammond, the head 
of the Kentucky State Building Trades Council, voiced the stand of organized labor: 
"We're going to draw a line here and take a stand . . . . [agreeing to Ohbayahi‟s terms] 
would be like digging our own grave.”
142
   
Hammond took the lead in the union‟s fight against Ohbayashi in Kentucky.  As 
attempts to unionize continued, it became obvious that the conflict was not just between 
Ohbayashi and the Building Trades Council.  The real conflict was between Toyota and 
union leaders.  While negotiations between the Building Trades Council and Ohbayashi 
were carried out around a table, the larger conflict was played out in the court of public 
opinion.   
For the purposes of understanding the formation of Kentucky‟s relationship with 
Toyota, it is more important to appreciate public sentiment concerning the union fight 
and not just the legal debate.  In point of fact, the two were often confused at the time.  
The Lexington Herald-Leader, at one point, was forced to print a retraction when it 
reported that the AFL-CIO had met with Toyota officials.
143
  They had, in reality, met 
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with officials from Ohbayashi.  Taking this confusion into account, Hammond and other 
union officials chose to pressure Toyota instead of Ohbayashi. Bill Londrigan, who 
worked as a researcher for Hammond, said about Toyota and Ohbayashi, “From our 
perspective they were one and the same . . . . Ohbayashi wasn‟t going to do anything 
without Toyota being one hundred percent in agreement.”
144
  Public sentiment mattered 
far more to the auto company than to Ohbayashi.  While Ohbayashi catered to corporate 
clients, Toyota sold directly to the public.  It was also apparent that Toyota had 
significant power of coercion over Ohbayashi, because Toyota had frequently contracted 
with the Ohbayashi group over the course of forty years.
145
 
Londrigan has recalled public opinion as being a powerful force in favor of the 
Building Trades Council.  “We were trying to build pressure on them, that‟s what we 
were trying to do,” he recently said.  “We were pressuring them any which way we could 
to try and get them to come to the table.”
146
  In targeting Toyota and others who could be 
pressured, Hammond chose the most visible source of contention surrounding the deal.  
Direct tactics were not the only means unions officials used in order to pressure Toyota.  
Shortly after union negotiations with Ohbayashi broke down, Hammond petitioned the 
court to become part of the “friendly” lawsuit the state had filed questioning the legality 
of the incentives package.
147
   
In addition to challenging the package, Hammond disputed any other attempts by 
Toyota to advance construction of the plant.  He filed objections against the plant‟s air-
pollution permit and its waste-discharge permit.  While publicly denying that he was 
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trying to halt construction on the plant, Hammond continued to exercise obstructionist 
policies toward the company.
148
  Londrigan confirmed that time was a factor in the 
negotiations with Ohbayashi.  Commenting that millions of dollars of work had already 
been done before negotiations even began.  “Before we could even get our feet in the 
door they started construction work like lickety-split I mean we weren‟t even at the table 
until the thing started rolling.”
149
 
In one of its most visible moves, the Kentucky State Building Trades Council also 
ran television advertisements critical of Toyota.  The advertisements featured images of 
workers repairing the Statue of Liberty and claimed the Toyota plant project was a threat 
to American workers.  This move was clearly aimed at Toyota instead of Ohbayashi, 
revealing that Hammond‟s objective was to apply pressure to the auto company to 
intervene in the negotiations.  The advertisement‟s direct appeal to patriotism and 
reference to a foreign threat made obvious use of American fears of Japan.  Accusations 
of xenophobia and outright racism implicit in the imagery caused considerable 
controversy.  Many found the advertisements so objectionable that Lexington television 
stations refused to air them.  They were only aired in Louisville.
150
 
The debate surrounding the use of union workers at the construction site was so 
threatening to the project that Lieutenant Governor Beshear wrote a letter to Martha 
Layne Collins urging her to become personally involved in the negotiations.  He also 
offered his own services to help broker an agreement.  Citing the harm the situation could 
cause for future business recruitment, Beshear wrote that “the Commonwealth can ill 
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afford to have this situation escalated into a long-term national labor-management 
problem.”
151
  Five Kentucky legislators also expressed apprehension, sending letters of 
concern to Collins, Toyota Chairman Dr. Shoichiro Toyoda, and the Ohbayashi 
Corporation.
152
 
Toyota faced a significant amount of pressure applied by public opinion and the 
state legislature. Hammond continued to attempt legal action to delay construction of the 
plant.  The company was also facing a possible shift in power to a governor who regarded 
the company less favorably.  By August, the AFL-CIO was calling for a boycott of 
Toyota vehicles.
153
  Toyota executives fully understood the situation the company was in 
and the power of public opinion.  Toyota‟s general manager in Lexington told that city‟s 
Rotary Club, “The Kentucky project cannot be considered a success unless Toyota and 
the community coexist in harmony.”
154
  By November the union was staging protests 
against Toyota outside the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C.  They had also 
announced plans to picket the embassy on December 7, the anniversary of the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor.
155
  Before that date, however, Ohbayashi settled its negotiations 
with the Trades Council and agreed to hire workers, union and non-union, through union 
shops.  While Toyota admitted no direct role in the settlement, most agreed that the 
automaker had decided not to risk harming public relations any further and had coerced 
Ohbayashi into a settlement.
156
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The settlement as well as other actions by the company signified that Toyota (as 
well as those in organized labor) was well aware of the power that citizens wielded over 
the success of the venture.  In the most extreme of these situations, Toyota also 
understood the palpable undercurrent of racism that pervaded the public debate.  Many 
Americans held outright animosity towards the Japanese.  But even more worrisome, 
many more held beliefs of American superiority that could easily be used by those 
seeking to derail the plant for their own reasons.  
 
The Opposition and the People: 
Concerned Citizens and Businessmen of Central Kentucky 
  
The second opposition group to Toyota seemed to have no specific goal other 
than to oppose either the deal with Toyota or certain parts of it.  The Concerned Citizens 
and Businessmen of Central Kentucky (CCBCK) rapidly voiced opposition after the 
initial announcement of the plant.
157
  As one of the first and the most vocal of the 
opposition groups, the CCBCK attracted those who opposed the deal for a variety of 
reasons.  However, the most unifying factor for its members was resistance and suspicion 
directed against the Japanese people.  Individual group members encompassed all of the 
fears that many Americans felt towards the Japanese. 
An accurate assessment of any foreign implant cannot be achieved without 
examining racism at the time.  Undoubtedly, racial bias played a large role in Toyota‟s 
struggle to gain acceptance in Kentucky, yet it is important not to place undue emphasis 
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on a single phenomenon.  At times racial discrimination masked itself in terms of 
national security; however, it must be understood that few who believed that Japanese 
economic power represented an actual threat to security were racially motivated.  
Understanding that it is impossible to comprehend exactly an individual‟s true 
motivation, an examination of possibilities must be performed.   
As the group most responsible for the use of rhetoric referring to race or 
nationality, the CCBCK represents the best place to begin a discussion of race as it 
applied to the Toyota project and Central Kentucky.  However, the CCBCK was by no 
means the only group that used racial or xenophobic terminology to press their opinion.  
It has been shown that the AFL-CIO and others exploited fears of foreigners or jingoistic 
rhetoric to draw support for their cause.  [A few examples include the previously 
mentioned anti-Toyota commercials and the planned demonstrations on the anniversary 
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.]  The difference is that the AFL-CIO had a 
defined goal of eventually unionizing the Toyota plant.  The CCBCK housed individuals 
with varied goals and reasoning, yet all directly opposed the venture. 
The CCBCK drew many who opposed the plant but were unaffiliated with or 
opposed to unions.  As the only group whose motivations were varied, the CCBCK 
represented a glimpse of the myriad reasons that caused many to criticize Toyota.  
However, in its public dealings the group most often mentioned three fears about the 
project: fear of Japan‟s economic power, concerns about the incentives package, 
lingering suspicion of the Japanese because of the Second World War.   This is also true 
of the dozens of letters to the governor‟s office protesting the plant.
158
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By far the most mentioned problem with the deal was the incentives package.  
However, the large amount of money involved indicated many things to many people.  
The head of the CCBCK, Don Wiggins, called the incentive “a giant step backward 
toward socialism.”
159
  Meanwhile, most simply considered the deal a giveaway of state 
money that represented both a loss to the state as well as a symptom of Kentucky‟s 
acquiescing power to a large business.  To many, the large payout for the plant felt like 
the state was, in effect, begging Toyota to come to Kentucky.  On a personal level it is 
perhaps understandable how many could view the government‟s action as a loss of face 
for the state.  Viewed through a prism of perceived inferiority to Japan the large 
incentives package could easily be seen as the state admitting that the only way it could 
improve its economic condition was to appeal to a foreign company.  This phenomenon 
could also explain why many felt so strongly about the Toyota project.  As was shown 
earlier, the rest of the country believed that Japan would soon surpass the United States as 
the strongest economic power in the world.  In this state of pessimistic public mood 
reinforced by significant media coverage around the country a large foreign company 
making such a large impact in the region would have instantly been regarded with 
suspicion. 
The strong feelings about the agreement may explain why past fears, already 
affecting the country, brought many to link Toyota with perceived Japanese economic 
aggression.  This fear easily led to a third factor in the resistance many felt toward 
Toyota.  In most contexts, fear of Japan‟s economic power and memories of World War 
Two were inseparable.  Certainly, in some cases the linking of Japan with the Second 
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World War, such as union protests on the anniversary of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, was 
a deliberate attempt to draw sympathy to their cause.  However, it is also clear that many 
legitimately held these views.   
Often in recalling the war many people referred to an economic war or invasion.  
Many echoed the sentiments of CCBCK member Glenn Roberts who said, "They tried to 
defeat our country in World War II with military force. They come out of that with 
another plan - 'we'll take their industry.'"
160
  This rhetoric applying hostile terminology to 
economic situations clearly indicates that many citizens of Kentucky followed the 
national media of the day.  As was shown earlier, much of America feared Japanese 
economic power. 
Letters of protest received in the governor‟s office also frequently made reference 
to war fears and lingering animosity.  Many accused the governor of treason, while others 
mailed clippings from various national newspapers and magazines that made reference to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor or Japanese economic aggression.  With the exception of a few 
letters posing concerns about the plant‟s environmental impact, all of the letters 
questioned the large incentives package.
161
  As one letter writer said, “I fought these 
people in the 40‟s and now my tax dollars are being used to make their life better.”  The 
writer also wondered how many of the jobs created would be for Japanese nationals.
162
  
Another writer said, “ask yourself this question-„Why do I want to give jobs to the 
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Japanese when our own unemployment situation is critical?‟  Do you want us to be 
stabbed in the back again?”
163
 
As these examples show, many around the state had little understanding of the 
particulars of the deal with Toyota.  Some believed that the plant would be staffed 
entirely by Japanese.  Others thought that the state was dealing directly with Japan.  With 
little exception those who wrote to the governor opposing the plant referred to Toyota, 
Japan, and the Japanese as interchangeable.
164
  This provides strong anecdotal evidence 
that Toyota, in the minds of many Kentuckians, was a focus of citizens‟ feelings about 
Japan and that many equated the plant with the national economic situation. 
It is unclear whether racist sentiment caused resistance to Toyota or resentment of 
the incentives package gave rise to greater than average racist rhetoric.  While an 
examination of race, in total, is beyond the purview of this work, it is nonetheless 
important to realize that racial sentiments did play a role in the debate.  It is imperative to 
examine these racial frictions because the clash of culture also displays the power of 
popular voice in affecting policy on the part of both Toyota and the state government. 
While it is hard to measure actual impact on the electorate, the racial imagery 
used by union leaders in anti-Toyota advertisements likely led Toyota to pressure a 
settlement between Ohbayashi and the Building and Construction Trades Union.  Toyota 
made the decision that it could ill afford to have the negative press caused by the building 
project at a time when it was establishing a base of operations in the United States and 
seeking to avoid unionization in the assembly plant once it was built.  Equally, while the 
victorious Wilkinson campaign did not in any way use racial posturing, it undoubtedly 
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benefited from its strong stance against the agreement by the previous administration.  In 
the matter of the growing relationship between Kentucky and Toyota, the question of race 
became one small factor in a myriad of issues facing the company and the community as 
residents weighed the perceived costs and benefits from the plant.  Against the other 
larger issues facing Georgetown, race quickly faded from the public forum just as the 
CCBCK faded as well.  By April 1987 the group could only manage five protesters when 
they picketed the offices of the Lexington Herald-Leader complaining of pro-Japanese 
bias.
165
 
 
The Local Government and the People: 
 
 If one word could describe the local government‟s situation in Georgetown and 
Scott County during the construction of the Toyota plant, it would be “overwhelmed.”  
Before the announcement of the Toyota plant, Georgetown had a population of around 
11,000 and had over 170,000 acres of land devoted to agriculture.
166
  (At the time Scott 
County listed only twenty-six residents of Asian or Pacific origin.)
167
  In the following 
years the population in Georgetown increased significantly. By 2000 the official census 
population stood at 18,080.
168
  As community leaders struggled to deal with increased 
demands on public utilities, services, and roadways, local citizens struggled to grasp what 
shape the community would have after the plant was established. 
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 Local government leaders were given little advance warning before the Toyota 
announcement.  They were, of course, aware that the community was under consideration 
for the plant, but negotiations were handled at the state level.
169
  This exclusion from the 
decision-making process had a great impact on how the community and its leaders 
reacted to the agreement.  Georgetown mayor George Lenahan and Scott County Judge-
Executive Charlie Sutton both participated in helping to show the county to visiting 
Toyota officials in 1985, and both of the local leaders also encouraged the deal.
170
  This is 
not to say, however, that the impact of the deal did not negatively affect local officials.  
And by the time of the beginning of construction new officials were entering office in the 
aftermath of a local campaign held in late 1985.
171
  The pending industrial boon does not 
seem to have played a significant role in the local elections.  It seems that the reality of 
the pressure of their new situation was unknown to the newly elected local officials. 
 Speaking about the new Mayor, George Lusby, a member of the town council told 
the media, "What used to be a laid-back, part-time job has become an impossible job for 
one person."
172
  Georgetown‟s new mayor, Samuel Pollock, who complained of 
“telephone elbow” was confronted with a barrage of unexpected problems.  He told the 
Lexington Herald-Leader, “One of the biggest problems . . . . is lack of information. 
Nobody has told the city what the state is going to do to help alleviate these gigantic 
problems.  You just don‟t know.  You‟re in the dark.”
173
   City officials specifically 
mentioned problems of overcrowding in schools and traffic congestion.  Community 
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officials were not the only ones to voice concerns about problems that the plant could 
cause.  Other perceived problems mentioned within the community were:  Increased 
crime and pollution, higher cost of living, shortages in housing, higher taxes, and harm to 
local farms.
174
   
 In questioning the Toyota project, however, local leaders rarely directed 
frustrations at the automaker.  Instead, most friction in the debate occurred between the 
state government and local officials.  Local leaders felt that the state had the duty to assist 
in the transition their community was undergoing.  Requests for assistance, though, were 
apparently given minimal priority by the governor.  Referring to state officials, Pollock 
said, ”I would suspect they feel they have brought this multimillion dollar industry in at 
considerable expense, so the spinoff[sic] in jobs and taxes should be sufficient for us . . . . 
But we still have concerns about what will happen between construction and the time 
when we get money from taxes.”
175
   
 The local government‟s role as both cheerleader for Toyota and antagonist toward 
the state represented the feelings of many in the community.  As has been shown, many 
in Georgetown sensed that they had been left out of the discussion and felt resentment 
towards those in the state government who had brokered the deal.  However, most in the 
county also saw the benefits, such as jobs, that could come with the factory.  Local 
leaders were those most accountable to and closest to local citizens.  They lived and 
worked in the community.  They were, in fact, true representatives of the community in 
that they were both elected officials and citizens/residents.  Thus a discussion of local 
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reaction and perception of Toyota is best understood within a dialogue of local politics.  
As a matter of understanding public opinion the two often were (and remain) inseparable.  
 When discussing public opinion concerning Toyota two important caveats must 
be mentioned.  First, as is to be expected, opinions often differed (especially concerning 
the incentives package) according to geographic separation from the area of the plant.
176
  
This is, obviously, because the greater the distance one was from the plant, the fewer 
benefits that individual could expect in terms of increased employment.  However, in 
analyzing the nature of the relationship between Toyota and the state, the initial contact 
between the company and the local region would play the most pivotal role.  This is 
because the region would come to act for the state as a form of litmus test for other 
regions that might have a supplier of the Georgetown plant in their community.  This is 
also because geographic distance provided eastern and western parts of the 
commonwealth the objectivity to play the role of observer and to form opinion based 
upon evidence provided by the Toyota experiment.   
The exception to this situation was that far eastern Kentucky had other reasons to 
become resentful of the situation.  Toyota officials chose to use natural gas instead of 
coal to power the plant.  This was inflammatory to the eastern coalfield regions of the 
state.  Furthermore, Columbia Gas, which would provide gas for the plant, raised its rates 
for its customers in eastern Kentucky as well as central Kentucky in order to pay for the 
pipeline to the plant.
177
   Thus most in the eastern part of the state saw little direct benefit 
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from the venture and a heavy burden.  This, more than geographic distance, probably led 
the eastern part of the state to be reluctant to accept Toyota.   
Second, it is important to understand the role of economic class in the formation 
of opinions about Toyota. While economic concerns often outweigh class cohesion it is 
important to understand the underlying currents in regards to initial perceptions 
concerning the prospect of the Toyota plant.  While many would reach similar 
conclusions in the matter to the evolution of opinion, the underlying causes for these 
decisions often dictated where opinions would diverge in other areas related to Toyota.   
A distinct class separation can be seen in examining letters sent to the governor‟s 
office concerning Toyota.  In the months following the announcement of the Toyota 
project, the governor‟s office received some forty letters of concern directly related to the 
project.  Of these, the majority appeared to be from people who would be considered 
working class, middle class, or lower class.  While many specifically mentioned their 
economic or job status, or exhibited a lack of education indicative of low economic 
status, almost all showed a level of class consciousness through identifying with those 
who would be considered proletarian or agrarian in origin.
178
  Most letters opposing the 
plant were hand-written and contained profanity, grammatical errors, and accusations that 
“they are now winning the economic war by „bombing‟ us with their auto plants.”
179
  
Many others lamented the environmental and urbanizing impact of the plant. 
While class cannot be determined concretely through allusion or education status, 
the nature of the complaints to the governor strongly suggested that those of lower 
income and education were more likely to reject either the Toyota plant or the incentives 
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package.  This is by no means indicative of the wisdom of the deal.  However, by 
recognizing the difference in class reaction it is clear that many on the lower tier of 
Kentucky society perceived no immediate benefits to be gained from a relationship with 
the multinational corporation.  It also reveals that in the battle for public opinion those in 
blue-collar industry were the focus of attention for both those against the plant and its 
proponents.  For the relationship to develop in an agreeable manner, those who were 
suspicious of the company, and those who spoke loudest, were the power base in control 
of Toyota‟s success.  In other words, while class may have played a role in a person‟s 
likelihood of welcoming the plant, all economic classes held a significant degree of 
power in the success of the venture. 
Conversely to the letters of complaint, the governor received over fifty letters of 
congratulations for her role in bringing Toyota to Kentucky.  With few exceptions, the 
vast majority of letters expressly articulating support for the Toyota deal were printed on 
paper containing company or governmental letterheads.  Business leaders and politicians 
from across the state were widely supportive of the venture.  This fact by no means 
displays the degree to which these individuals identified with upper class or bourgeois 
society.  The fact that most of those supportive of the deal were also from professional 
and business classes and felt strongly enough to articulate this in writing to the 
governor‟s office provides strong indications of the underlying issues that formed initial 
opinion.  This is further supported by a sociological study by James G. Hougland Jr. that 
found a strong correlation between income level and likelihood a respondent would be 
supportive of TMMK.
180
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A study conducted by the University of Kentucky examining public opinion in 
Scott County revealed that class determinants such as income and education level 
indicated a person‟s likely response to the plant.  Those who had failed to graduate from 
high school answered about 15 percent less favorably when they were asked if they 
believed the plant would benefit the area.  However, within this group, the percentage 
favorable to Toyota was still the majority at 54.9 percent.
181
 
Race and social class may have been factors in the base from which a relationship 
formed between Kentucky and Toyota.  However, the most important factor in the 
relationship building process was what Robert Perrucci described as a cost versus benefit 
analysis.  That is, members of society measured the benefits of the plant against the 
negative impact it could have.  Much of this analysis occurred before the first automobile 
was produced during the construction phase of the enterprise.  Perrucci pointed out that 
often the media and the government played a large role in this decision-making process: 
Newspaper stories remind the reader repeatedly of the company‟s $800 
million investment; of the two thousand production workers to be hired; of 
the $40 million payroll that will flow into the county; of the spin-off 
companies and thousands of jobs that will follow the transplant.  And even 
before any of these things come to pass, there will be two to three years of 
construction with over one thousand workers and an $11 million 
payroll.
182
   
  
 Although the media held a significant amount of power and could have become 
an arbiter or advocate in the budding relationship, news sources and the local 
government, also gave a large amount of attention to negative factors involved with the 
plant.  Frankfort‟s State Journal published six editorials in 1986 critical of the state‟s 
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incentives package.
183
  Georgetown‟s mayor, while supportive of the plant, often 
complained about the lack of assistance from the state with problems associated with 
overcrowding and the drain on local public facilities.
184
  By September 1986, Samuel 
Pollock resigned as mayor of Georgetown due to health concerns.  In his statement to the 
media, Pollock cited the pressures associated with accommodating the sudden impact of 
the plant on his community.
185
   
 Pollock‟s resignation is emblematic of the stresses on the Georgetown community 
during the initial phases of the Toyota project.  In the study of public opinion conducted 
by the University of Kentucky the majority of those questioned mentioned fears 
associated with large-scale industry and growth.  School crowding and increases in crime 
and pollution were among the fears most often cited.  Attitudes about the plant itself 
seemed to be ambivalent, with an almost even split in support for the incentives package.  
Equally large percentages cited both positive and negative aspects of the plant.
186
   
 This hesitant attitude among the populace in Scott County is indicative of a 
situation that transcended simple classifications of class and race.  While proponents on 
both sides of the issue made attempts to appeal to certain segments of the population, it 
appears that citizens of central Kentucky adopted an attitude of reserved judgment.  This 
ability to remain un-swayed by the strong rhetoric on either side of the issue indicated 
that the citizens of Georgetown were willing to reserve judgment until further evidence 
was presented. 
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 It cannot be concluded that failure to reach an overwhelming community 
consensus is indicative of a populace that is resigned to a situation forced upon it.  The 
local government of Georgetown remained adamant in criticism of both the state 
government and Toyota.  Residents in Scott County also frequently voiced concerns 
through demonstrations and lawsuits concerning matters from water to development.  
What is interesting, however, is that most of these complaints from citizens and local 
government were not directed at Toyota.  The state government bore the brunt of these 
criticisms.
187
  By September 1987 Tom Prather, who had succeeded Sam Pollock as 
mayor, had become strongly critical of Governor Collins.  His letters to the governor, it 
was said, requesting aid had gone unanswered for months.
188
  This slow response from 
the state government may have aided Toyota which was much more responsive to local 
concerns.  Asking to be annexed by the city and making various charitable donations 
allowed Toyota to play towards the needs of the community that were going unheeded by 
the state.  While Toyota was still an unknown entity to many residents, the resentment 
that had been generated by the state government allowed citizens to see positive 
possibilities.  Prather voiced this attitude in 1987: "There is a degree of unknown about 
what changes will come . . . . It would be naive to think there won't be problems with a 
project this size. But the benefits outweigh the problems."
189
   
 Perhaps the best indicator of the public‟s role in the developing relationship is that 
polls showed a steady increase in favorable views of the Toyota plant.  Between 1986 and 
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1995, the percentage of Scott County residents who said Toyota was benefiting the 
community went from just over 75 percent in 1986 to 90 percent in 1995.
190
     
Citizens of Scott County exercised a significant amount of power and influence in 
the developing relationship with Toyota.  Through local government and the media they 
voiced criticism and demanded accommodations from both Toyota and the state.  As one 
of the parties in the courtship involving the state and Toyota, Georgetown played one of 
the most vital roles in determining the nature of the pairing and retained significant 
control over local industrial policy. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Given the secrecy involved in negotiations and the power represented by the state 
government and a large multinational corporation it is easy to assume that the 
introduction of TMMK to Georgetown was the result of large forces acting from outside 
a community.  It would also be easy to assume that these forces spurred a progress that 
was both inevitable and beneficent to citizens who could only accept (in many cases 
grudgingly) the overwhelming tide of good fortune that progress carried in its wake. 
 Research reveals that this was not the case.  The actions of citizens in Kentucky 
caused changes and reactions from both the state government and Toyota that forced 
events to shift in directions they favored.  This is especially true in the case of Toyota 
which made donations and allowed the plant to be annexed by Georgetown in order to 
help alleviate the pressure the facility placed on local public services.  Toyota also 
forestalled much of the possible trouble with union forces by allowing union labor to be 
used in the construction of the plant.  Despite the governor‟s public relations blitz 
following the announcement of the incentives package, Kentucky later elected a governor 
critical of some aspects of the deal.  Although the incentives deal passed quickly through 
the legislature, rifts quickly formed later.  For their part the citizens of Scott County and 
their local leaders in Georgetown overlooked many of the negative impacts of the 
growing industry for the sake of future benefits that the majority viewed as favorable. 
 As events moved forward the courtship continued.  While each party exercised 
power, one conclusion can be drawn: each party desired a relationship.  The events were 
83 
 
not inevitable.  Industrial development was a choice, not a definite conclusion.  The 
desire to form a union of equal interest drove the courtship of Toyota.  It is within this 
desire on the part of all involved that true history was made. 
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